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Abstract
Over the years, nonmonotonic rules have proven to be a very expressive and useful knowledge repre-
sentation paradigm. They have recently been used to complement the expressive power of Descrip-
tion Logics (DLs), leading to the study of integrative formal frameworks, generally referred to as
hybrid knowledge bases, where both DL axioms and rules can be used to represent knowledge. The
need to use these hybrid knowledge bases in dynamic domains has called for the development of up-
date operators, which, given the substantially different way Description Logics and rules are usually
updated, has turned out to be an extremely difficult task.
In (Slota and Leite 2010b), a first step towards addressing this problem was taken, and an update
operator for hybrid knowledge bases was proposed. Despite its significance – not only for being
the first update operator for hybrid knowledge bases in the literature, but also because it has some
applications – this operator was defined for a restricted class of problems where only the ABox
was allowed to change, which considerably diminished its applicability. Many applications that use
hybrid knowledge bases in dynamic scenarios require both DL axioms and rules to be updated.
In this paper, motivated by real world applications, we introduce an update operator for a large
class of hybrid knowledge bases where both the DL component as well as the rule component are
allowed to dynamically change. We introduce splitting sequences and splitting theorem for hybrid
knowledge bases, use them to define a modular update semantics, investigate its basic properties, and
illustrate its use on a realistic example about cargo imports.
KEYWORDS: hybrid knowledge base, update, splitting theorem, ontology, logic program
1 Introduction
Increasingly many real world applications need to intelligently access and reason with large
amounts of dynamically changing, structured and highly interconnected information. The
family of Description Logics (DLs) (Baader et al. 2003), generally characterised as decid-
able fragments of first-order logic, have become the established standard for representing
ontologies, i.e. for specifying concepts relevant to a particular domain of interest. DLs can
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be seen as some of the most expressive formalisms based on Classical Logic for which
decidable reasoning procedures still exist.
On the other hand, nonmonotonic rules have also proven to be a very useful tool for
knowledge representation. They complement the expressive power of DLs, adding the pos-
sibility to reason with incomplete information using default negation, and offering natural
ways of expressing exceptions, integrity constraints and complex queries. Their formal un-
derpinning lies with declarative, well-understood semantics, the stable model semantics
(Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) and its tractable approximation, the well-founded semantics
(Gelder et al. 1991), being the most prominent and widely accepted.
This has led to the need to integrate these distinct knowledge representation paradigms.
Over the last decade, there have been many proposals for integrating DLs with nonmono-
tonic rules (see (Hitzler and Parsia 2009) for a survey). One of the more mature proposals
is Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases (Motik and Rosati 2007) that allow predicates to be
defined concurrently in both an ontology and a set of rules, while enjoying several impor-
tant properties. A tractable variant of this formalism, based on the well-founded seman-
tics, allows for a top-down querying procedure (Knorr et al. 2011), making the approach
amenable to practical applications that need to deal with large knowledge bases.
While such formalisms make it possible to seamlessly combine rules and ontologies in
a single unified framework, they do not take into account the highly dynamic character of
application areas where they are to be used. In (Slota and Leite 2010b) we made a first step
towards a solution to this problem, addressing updates by defining a change operation on
a knowledge base to record a change that occurred in the modelled world.
Update operators have first been studied in the context of action theories and relational
databases with NULL values (Winslett 1988; Winslett 1990). The basic intuition behind
these operators is that the models of a knowledge base represent possible states of the
world and when a change in the world needs to be recorded, each of these possible worlds
should be modified as little as possible in order to arrive at a representation of the world
after the update. This means that, in each possible world, each propositional atom retains
its truth value as long as there is no update that directly requires it to change. In other
words, inertia is applied to the atoms of the underlying language. Later, these operators
were successfully applied to partially address updates of DL ontologies (Liu et al. 2006;
Giacomo et al. 2006).
But when updates were studied in the context of rules, most authors found atom iner-
tia unsatisfactory. One of the main reasons for this is the clash between atom inertia and
the property of support (Apt et al. 1988; Dix 1995), which lies at the heart of most logic
programming semantics. For instance, when updating a logic program P = { p← q., q. }
by Q = { ∼q. },1 atom inertia dictates that p must stay true after the update because
the update itself does not in any way directly affect the truth value of p. Example 7 in
(Giacomo et al. 2006), where a similar update is performed on an analogical DL ontology,
shows that such a behaviour may be desirable. However, from a logic programming point
of view, one expects p to become false after the update. This is because when q ceases
being true, the reason for p to be true disappears as it is no longer supported by any rule.
1 The symbol ∼ denotes default negation.
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These intuitions, together with a battery of intuitive examples (Leite and Pereira 1997;
Alferes et al. 2000), led to the introduction of the causal rejection principle (Leite and Pereira 1997)
and subsequently to several approaches to rule updates (Alferes et al. 2000; Eiter et al. 2002;
Leite 2003; Alferes et al. 2005) that are fundamentally different from classical update op-
erators. The basic unit of information to which inertia is applied is no longer an atom, but a
rule. This means that a rule stays in effect as long as it does not directly contradict a newer
rule. The truth values of atoms are not directly subject to inertia, but are used to determine
the set of rules that are overridden by newer rules, and are themselves determined by the
remaining rules.
However, the dichotomy between classical and rule updates goes far beyond the different
units of information to which inertia is applied. While classical updates are performed on
the models of a knowledge base, which renders them syntax-independent, the property of
support, being syntactic in its essence, forces rule update methods to refer to the syntactic
structure of underlying programs – the individual rules they contain and, in many cases,
also the heads and bodies of these rules. As we have shown in (Slota and Leite 2010a),
even when classical updates are applied to SE-models (Lifschitz et al. 2001; Turner 2003),
a monotonic semantics for logic programs that is more expressive than stable models, the
property of support is lost. On the other hand, applying rule updates to DL ontologies leads
to a range of technical difficulties. Some of them are caused by the fact that rule update
methods are specifically tailored towards identifying and resolving conflicts between pairs
of rules. DL axioms do not have a rule-like structure, and a group of pairwise consistent
axioms may enter in a conflict. Other difficulties stem from the fact that such a syntactic
approach can hardly exhibit behaviour similar to that of classical updates, where reasoning
by cases is inherent in updating each model of a knowledge base independently of all
others. Thus, no single method seems suitable for updating hybrid knowledge bases. A
general update operator for hybrid knowledge must somehow integrate these apparently
irreconcilable approaches to dealing with evolving knowledge.
In (Slota and Leite 2010b) we simplified this hard task by keeping rules static and allow-
ing the ontology component of a hybrid knowledge base to evolve. Despite the importance
of this first step, the applicability of the operator is considerably diminished since typically
all parts of a knowledge base are subject to change. As an example, consider the following
scenario where both ontologies and rules are needed to assess the risk of imported cargo.
Example 1 (A Hybrid Knowledge Base for Cargo Imports)
The Customs service for any developed country assesses imported cargo for a variety of
risk factors including terrorism, narcotics, food and consumer safety, pest infestation, tar-
iff violations, and intellectual property rights.2 Assessing this risk, even at a preliminary
level, involves extensive knowledge about commodities, business entities, trade patterns,
government policies and trade agreements. Some of this knowledge may be external to
a given customs agency: for instance the broad classification of commodities according
to the international Harmonized Tariff System (HTS), or international trade agreements.
Other knowledge may be internal to a customs agency, such as lists of suspected violators
or of importers who have a history of good compliance with regulations. While some of
2 The system described here is not intended to reflect the policies of any country or agency.
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this knowledge is relatively stable, much of it changes rapidly. Changes are made not only
at a specific level, such as knowledge about the expected arrival date of a shipment; but at
a more general level as well. For instance, while the broad HTS code for tomatoes (0702)
does not change, the full classification and tariffs for cherry tomatoes for import into the
US changes seasonally.
Figure 1 shows a simplified fragment K = 〈O,P〉 of such a knowledge base. In this
fragment, a shipment has several attributes: the country of its origination, the commodity it
contains, its importer, and its producer. The ontology contains a geographic classification,
along with information about producers who are located in various countries. It also con-
tains a classification of commodities based on their harmonised tariff information (HTS
chapters, headings and codes, cf. http://www.usitc.gov/tata/hts). Tariff in-
formation is also present, based on the classification of commodities. Finally, the ontology
contains (partial) information about three shipments: s1, s2 and s3. There is also a set
of rules indicating information about importers, and about whether to inspect a shipment
either to check for compliance of tariff information or for food safety issues.
In this paper, we define an update semantics for hybrid knowledge bases that can be
used to deal with scenarios such as the one described above. As a theoretical basis for
this operator, we first establish a splitting theorem for Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases,
analogical to the splitting theorem for logic programs (Lifschitz and Turner 1994). The un-
derlying notions then serve us as theoretical ground for identifying a constrained class of
hybrid knowledge bases for which a plausible update semantics can be defined by modu-
larly combining a classical and a rule update operator. We then examine basic properties
of this semantics, showing that it
• generalises Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases (Motik and Rosati 2007).
• generalises the classical minimal change update operator (Winslett 1990).
• generalises the refined dynamic stable model semantics (Alferes et al. 2005).
• adheres to the principle of primacy of new information (Dalal 1988).
Finally, we demonstrate that it properly deals with nontrivial updates in scenarios such as
the one described in Example 1.
The rest of this document is structured as follows: We introduce the necessary theoretical
background in Sect. 2. Then, in Sect. 3, we establish the splitting theorem for Hybrid
MKNF Knowledge Bases, identify a constrained class of such knowledge bases and define
a plausible update operator for it. We also take a closer look at its properties and show how
it can be applied to deal with updates of the knowledge base introduced in Example 1. We
then discuss our results in Sect. 4 and point towards desirable future developments.3
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present the formal basis for our investigation. We introduce the unify-
ing semantic framework of Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases (Motik and Rosati 2007) that
3 At http://centria.di.fct.unl.pt/
˜
jleite/iclp11full.pdf the reader can find an ex-
tended version of this paper with proofs.
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* * * O * * *
Commodity ≡ (∃HTSCode.⊤) EdibleVegetable ≡ (∃HTSChapter. { ‘07’ })
CherryTomato ≡ (∃HTSCode. { ‘07020020’ }) Tomato ≡ (∃HTSHeading. { ‘0702’ })
GrapeTomato ≡ (∃HTSCode. { ‘07020010’ }) Tomato ⊑ EdibleVegetable
CherryTomato ⊑ Tomato GrapeTomato ⊑ Tomato
CherryTomato ⊓ Bulk ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $0 }) CherryTomato ⊓ GrapeTomato ⊑ ⊥
GrapeTomato ⊓ Bulk ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $40 }) Bulk ⊓ Prepackaged ⊑ ⊥
CherryTomato ⊓ Prepackaged ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $50 })
GrapeTomato ⊓ Prepackaged ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $100 })
EURegisteredProducer ≡ (∃RegisteredProducer.EUCountry)
LowRiskEUCommodity ≡ (∃ExpeditableImporter.⊤) ⊓ (∃CommodCountry.EUCountry)
〈p1 , portugal 〉 : RegisteredProducer 〈p2 , slovakia〉 : RegisteredProducer
portugal : EUCountry slovakia : EUCountry
〈s1 , c1 〉 : ShpmtCommod 〈s1 , ‘07020020’〉 : ShpmtDeclHTSCode
〈s1 , i1 〉 : ShpmtImporter c1 : CherryTomato c1 : Bulk
〈s2 , c2 〉 : ShpmtCommod 〈s2 , ‘07020020’〉 : ShpmtDeclHTSCode
〈s2 , i2 〉 : ShpmtImporter c2 : CherryTomato c2 : Prepackaged
〈s2 , portugal〉 : ShpmtCountry
〈s3 , c3 〉 : ShpmtCommod 〈s3 , ‘07020010’〉 : ShpmtDeclHTSCode
〈s3 , i3 〉 : ShpmtImporter c3 : GrapeTomato c3 : Bulk
〈s3 , portugal〉 : ShpmtCountry 〈s3 , p1 〉 : ShpmtProducer
* * * P * * *
CommodCountry(C,Country) ← ShpmtCommod(S,C),ShpmtCountry(S,Country).
AdmissibleImporter(I)← ∼SuspectedBadGuy(I).
ExpeditableImporter(C, I)← AdmissibleImporter(I),ApprovedImporterOf(I,C).
SuspectedBadGuy(i1 ).
ApprovedImporterOf(i2 , C)← EdibleVegetable(C).
ApprovedImporterOf(i3 , C)← GrapeTomato(C).
CompliantShpmt(S) ← ShpmtCommod(S,C),HTSCode(C,D),ShpmtDeclHTSCode(S,D).
RandomInspection(S)← ShpmtCommod(S,C),Random(C).
PartialInspection(S)← RandomInspection(S).
PartialInspection(S)← ShpmtCommod(S,C),∼LowRiskEUCommodity(C).
FullInspection(S)← ∼CompliantShpmt(S).
FullInspection(S)← ShpmtCommod(S,C),Tomato(C),ShpmtCountry(S, slovakia).
Fig. 1. A Hybrid Knowledge Base for Cargo Imports
gives a semantics to a knowledge base composed of both DL axioms and rules. Since our
hybrid update operator is based on a modular combination a classical and a rule update op-
erator, we introduce a pair of such operators known from the literature and briefly discuss
the choices we make.
MKNF. The logic of Minimal Knowledge and Negation as Failure (MKNF) (Lifschitz 1991)
forms the logical basis of Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases. It is an extension of first-order
logic with two modal operators: K and not. We use the variant of this logic introduced
in (Motik and Rosati 2007). We assume a function-free first-order syntax extended by the
mentioned modal operators in a natural way. An atom is a formula P (t1, t2, . . . , tn) where
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P is a predicate symbol of arity n and ti are terms. An MKNF formula φ is a sentence if
it has no free variables; φ is ground if it does not contain variables; φ is subjective if all
atoms in φ occur within the scope of a modal operator; φ is first-order if it does not contain
modal operators. By φ[t/x] we denote the formula obtained by simultaneously replacing in
φ all free occurrences of variable x by term t. A set of first-order sentences is a first-order
theory. We denote the set of all predicate symbols by P. Given a formula φ, we inductively
define the set of predicate symbols relevant to φ, denoted by pr(φ), as follows:
1◦ If φ is an atom P (t1, t2, . . . , tn), then pr(φ) = {P };
2◦ If φ is of the form ¬ψ, then pr(φ) = pr(ψ);
3◦ If φ is of the form φ1 ∧ φ2, then pr(φ) = pr(φ1) ∪ pr(φ2);
4◦ If φ is of the form ∃x : ψ, then pr(φ) = pr(ψ);
5◦ If φ is of the form Kψ, then pr(φ) = pr(ψ);
6◦ If φ is of the form notψ, then pr(φ) = pr(ψ).
Given a set of formulae T , we define the set of predicate symbols relevant to T , denoted
by pr(T ), as follows:
pr(T ) =
⋃
φ∈T
pr(φ) .
As in (Motik and Rosati 2007), we only consider Herbrand interpretations in our se-
mantics. We adopt the standard names assumption, and apart from the constants used in
formulae, we assume our signature to contain a countably infinite supply of constants.
The Herbrand Universe of such a signature is denoted by ∆. The set of all (Herbrand)
interpretations is denoted by I. An MKNF structure is a triple 〈I,M,N〉 where I is an
interpretation and M,N are sets of Herbrand interpretations. The satisfiability of a ground
atom p and of an MKNF sentence φ in 〈I,M,N〉 is defined as follows
〈I,M,N〉 |= p iff I |= p
〈I,M,N〉 |= ¬φ iff 〈I,M,N〉 6|= φ
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ1 ∧ φ2 iff 〈I,M,N〉 |= φ1 and 〈I,M,N〉 |= φ2
〈I,M,N〉 |= ∃x : φ iff 〈I,M,N〉 |= φ[c/x] for some c ∈ ∆
〈I,M,N〉 |= Kφ iff 〈J,M,N〉 |= φ for all J ∈M
〈I,M,N〉 |= notφ iff 〈J,M,N〉 6|= φ for some J ∈ N
The symbols ∨, ∀ and ⊂ are interpreted as usual. The semantics of MKNF sentences is
summarised in the following definition:
Definition 2 (MKNF Interpretation and MKNF Model)
An MKNF interpretation is a nonempty set of Herbrand interpretations. We also define
M = 2I to be the set of all MKNF interpretations together with the empty set.
Let T be a set of MKNF sentences and M ∈ M. We write M |= T if 〈I,M,M〉 |= φ
for every φ ∈ T and all I ∈M .4 Otherwise we write M 6|= T .
4 Notice that if M is empty, this condition is vacuously satisfied for any formula φ, so any formula is true in
∅. For this reason, ∅ is not considered an interpretation and only nonempty subsets of M can be models of
formulae.
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If there exists the greatest M ∈ M such that M |= T , then we denote it by mod(T ).
For all other sets of formulae mod(T ) stays undefined.
If M is an MKNF interpretation (i.e. M is nonempty and M ∈ M), we say M is
• an S5 model of T if M |= T ;
• an MKNF model of T if M is an S5 model of T and for every MKNF interpretation
M ′ )M there is some I ′ ∈M ′ and some φ ∈ T such that 〈I ′,M ′,M〉 6|= φ.
We say a set of MKNF formulae T is MKNF satisfiable if an MKNF model of T exists;
otherwise it is MKNF unsatisfiable. The S5 (un)satisfiability is defined analogously by
considering S5 models instead of MKNF models. For a sentence φ, we write M |= φ
if and only if M |= {φ }; otherwise we write M 6|= φ. Also, mod(φ), S5 models of φ,
MKNF models of φ, MKNF (un)satisfiability and S5 (un)satisfiability of φ are defined as
mod({φ }), S5 models of {φ }, MKNF models of {φ }, MKNF (un)satisfiability of {φ }
and S5 (un)satisfiability of {φ }, respectively.
Let U ⊆ P be a set of predicate symbols, I, J ∈ I and M,N ∈ M. We define the
restriction of I to U as I [U ] = { p ∈ I | pr(p) ⊆ U } and the restriction of M to U as
M [U ] =
{
I [U ]
∣∣ I ∈M }. We say that I coincides with J on U if I [U ] = J [U ] and that M
coincides with N on U if M [U ] = N [U ].
Description Logics. Description Logics (Baader et al. 2003) are (usually) decidable frag-
ments of first-order logic that are frequently used for knowledge representation and reason-
ing in applications. Throughout the paper we assume that some Description Logic is used
to describe an ontology, i.e. it is used to specify a shared conceptualisation of a domain of
interest. Basic building blocks of such a specification are constants, representing objects
(or individuals), concepts, representing groups of objects, and roles, representing binary
relations between objects and properties of objects. Typically, an ontology is composed
of two distinguishable parts: a TBox specifying the required terminology, i.e. concept and
role definitions, and an ABox with assertions about constants.
Most Description Logics can be equivalently translated into function-free first-order
logic, with constants represented by constant symbols, atomic concepts represented by
unary predicates and atomic roles represented by binary predicates. We assume that for
any DL axiom φ, ζ (φ) denotes such a translation of φ. We also define pr(φ) as pr(ζ (φ)).
Generalised Logic Programs. We consider ground logic programs for specifying non-
monotonic domain knowledge. The basic syntactic blocks of such programs are ground
atoms. A default literal is a ground atom preceded by ∼. A literal is either a ground atom
or a default literal. As a convention, due to the semantics of rule updates that we adopt
in what follows, double default negation is absorbed, so that ∼∼p denotes the atom p.
A rule r is an expression of the form L0 ← L1, L2, . . . , Lk where k is a natural num-
ber and L0, L1, . . . , Lk are literals. We say H(r) = L0 is the head of r and B(r) =
{L1, L2, . . . , Ln } is the body of r. A rule r is a fact if its body is empty; r is positive if its
head is an atom. A generalised logic program (GLP) P is a set of rules. The set of predicate
symbols occurring in a literal L, set of literals B and a rule r is denoted by pr(L), pr(B)
and pr(r), respectively. An interpretation I is a stable model of a GLP P if I ′ = least(P ∪
{∼p | p is an atom and p /∈ I }), where I ′ = I ∪ { not p | p is an atom and p /∈ I } and
least(·) denotes the least model of the program obtained from the argument program by
replacing every default literal ∼p by a fresh atom not p.
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Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases. A hybrid knowledge base is a pair 〈O,P〉 where
O is an ontology and P is a generalised logic program. The semantics is assigned to a
hybrid knowledge base using a translation function pi that translates both ontology ax-
ioms and rules into MKNF sentences. For any ontology O, ground atom p, set of liter-
als B, rule r, program P and hybrid knowledge base K = 〈O,P〉, we define: pi(O) =
{K ζ (φ) | φ ∈ O }, pi(p) = K p, pi(∼p) = not p, pi(B) = { pi(L) | L ∈ B }, pi(r) =
(pi(H(r)) ⊂
∧
pi(B(r))), pi(P) = { pi(r) | r ∈ P } and pi(K) = pi(O)∪pi(P). An MKNF
interpretationM is an S5 (MKNF) model of K if M is an S5 (MKNF) model of pi(K).
As was shown in (Lifschitz 1991), the MKNF semantics generalises the stable model
semantics for logic programs (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) – for every logic program P ,
the stable models of P directly correspond to MKNF models of pi(P).
Classical Updates. As a basis for our update operator, we adopt an update semantics
called the minimal change update semantics (Winslett 1990) for updating first-order theo-
ries. This update semantics offers a simple realisation of atom inertia, satisfies all Katsuno
and Mendelzon’s postulates for belief update (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991), and it has
successfully been used to deal with ABox updates (Liu et al. 2006; Giacomo et al. 2006).
A notion of closeness between interpretations w.r.t. a fixed interpretation I is used to
determine the result of an update. This closeness is based on the set of ground atoms
that are interpreted differently than in I . For a predicate symbol P and an interpretation
I , we denote the set { p ∈ I | pr(p) = {P } } by I [P ]. Given interpretations I , J , J ′, the
difference in the interpretation of P between I and J , written diff (P, I, J), is the set
(I [P ]\J [P ])∪(J [P ]\I [P ]). We say that J is at least as close to I as J ′, denoted by J ≤I J ′,
if for every predicate symbol P it holds that diff (P, I, J) is a subset of diff (P, I, J ′). We
also say that J is closer to I than J ′, denoted by J <I J ′, if J ≤I J ′ and not J ′ ≤I J .
The minimal change update semantics then keeps those models of the updating theory
that are the closest w.r.t. the relation ≤I to some model I of the original theory. Given
an interpretation I , sets of interpretations M , N , and first-order theories T ,U , we define:
I ⊕N = { J ∈ N | ¬(∃J ′ ∈ N)(J ′ <I J) }, M ⊕ N =
⋃
I∈M (I ⊕ N), and mod(T ⊕
U) = mod(T ) ⊕ mod(U). If mod(T ⊕ U) is nonempty, we say it is the minimal change
update model of T ⊕U . This notion can be naturally generalised to allow for sequences of
updates. Formally, given a finite sequence of first-order theories U = 〈Ui〉i<n, we define
mod(U) = (· · · ((mod(U0)⊕mod(U1))⊕mod(U2))⊕ · · · )⊕mod(Un−1). If mod(U) is
nonempty, we say it is the minimal change update model of U .
Rule Updates. There exists a variety of different approaches to rule change (Leite and Pereira 1997;
Alferes et al. 2000; Eiter et al. 2002; Sakama and Inoue 2003; Alferes et al. 2005; Zhang 2006;
Osorio and Cuevas 2007; Delgrande et al. 2007; Delgrande et al. 2008; Slota and Leite 2010a).
The more recent, purely semantic approaches (Delgrande et al. 2008; Slota and Leite 2010a)
are closely related to classical update operators such as Winslett’s operator presented
above. However, as indicated in (Slota and Leite 2010a), their main disadvantage is that
they violate the property of support that lies at the very heart of semantics of logic pro-
grams. Out of the approaches that do respect support, only the rule update semantics
presented in (Alferes et al. 2005; Zhang 2006) possess another important property: im-
munity to tautological and cyclic updates. We henceforth adopt the approach taken in
(Alferes et al. 2005) because, unlike in (Zhang 2006), it can be applied to any initial pro-
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gram, can easily be used to perform iterative updates and has a lower computational com-
plexity.
A dynamic logic program (DLP) is a finite sequence of GLPs. In order to define the
semantics for DLPs, based on causal rejection of rules, we define the notion of a conflict
between rules as follows: two rules r and r′ are conflicting, written r ⋊⋉ r′, if H(r) =
∼H(r′). Given a DLP P = 〈Pi〉i<n and an interpretation I , we use ρ(P) to denote the
multiset of all rules appearing in members of P and introduce the following notation:
Rej (P , I) = { r | (∃i, j, r′)(r ∈ Pi ∧ r
′ ∈ Pj ∧ i ≤ j ∧ r ⋊⋉ r
′ ∧ I |= B(r′)) } ,
Def (P , I) = { ∼p | (¬∃r ∈ ρ(P))(H(r) = p ∧ I |= B(r)) } .
An interpretation I is a dynamic stable model of a DLPP if I ′ = least([ρ(P)\Rej (P , I)]∪
Def (P , I)), where I ′ and least(·) are as in the definition of a stable model.
3 Splitting and Updating Hybrid Knowledge Bases
Our general objective is to define an update semantics for finite sequences of hybrid knowl-
edge bases, where each component represents knowledge about a new state of the world.
Definition 3 (Dynamic Hybrid Knowledge Base)
A dynamic hybrid knowledge base is a finite sequence of hybrid knowledge bases.
In this paper we develop an update operator for a particular class of syntactically con-
strained hybrid knowledge bases. The purpose of the constraints we impose is to ensure
that the ontology and rules can be updated separately from one another, and the results can
then be combined to obtain a plausible update semantics for the whole hybrid knowledge
base. Formally, the update semantics we introduce generalises and modularly combines a
classical and a rule update operator.
In order to identify these constraints, we introduce the splitting theorem for Hybrid
MKNF Knowledge Bases in Subsect. 3.1. Based on it, we identify a constrained class
of dynamic hybrid knowledge bases and define an update operator for that class in Sub-
sect. 3.2. Finally, in Subsect 3.3 we examine basic properties of the operator and illustrate
how it can deal with updates to the hybrid knowledge base from Example 1.
3.1 Splitting Theorem
The splitting theorem for Logic Programs (Lifschitz and Turner 1994) is a generalisation
of the notion of program stratification. Given a logic program P , a splitting set for P is
a set of atoms U such that the program can be divided in two subprograms, the bottom
and the top of P , such that rules in the bottom only contain atoms from U , and no atom
from U occurs in the head of any rule from the top. As a consequence, rules in the top
of P cannot influence the stable models of its bottom. The splitting theorem captures this
intuition, guaranteeing that each stable model of P is a union of a stable model X of the
bottom of P and of a stable model Y of a reduced version of the top of P where atoms
belonging to U are interpreted under X . This can be further generalised to sequences of
splitting sets that divide a program P into a sequence of layers. The splitting sequence
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theorem then warrants that stable models of P consist of a union of stable models of each
of its layers after appropriate reductions.
In the following we generalise these notions to Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases (Motik and Rosati 2007).
The first definition establishes the notion of a splitting set in this context.
Definition 4 (Splitting Set)
A splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K = 〈O,P〉 is any set of predicate symbols
U ⊆ P such that
1. For every ontology axiom φ ∈ O, if pr(φ) ∩ U 6= ∅, then pr(φ) ⊆ U .
2. For every rule r ∈ P , if pr(H(r)) ∩ U 6= ∅, then pr(r) ⊆ U ;
The set of ontology axioms φ ∈ O such that pr(φ) ⊆ U is called the bottom of O
relative to U and denoted by bU (O). The set of rules r ∈ P such that pr(r) ⊆ U is
called the bottom of P relative to U and denoted by bU (P). The hybrid knowledge base
bU (K) = 〈bU (O), bU (P)〉 is called bottom of K relative to U .
The set tU (O) = O \ bU (O) is the top of O relative to U . The set tU (P) = P \ bU (P)
is the top of P relative to U . The hybrid knowledge base tU (K) = 〈tU (O), tU (P)〉 is the
top of K relative to U .
Note that instead of defining a splitting set as a set of atoms, as was done in the case
of propositional logic programs, we define it as a set of predicate symbols. By doing this,
the set of ground atoms with the same predicate symbol is considered either completely
included in a splitting set, or completely excluded from it. While this makes our approach
slightly less general than it could be if we considered each ground atom individually, we
believe the conceptual simplicity is worth this sacrifice. Also, since all TBox axioms are
universally quantified, in many cases we would end up adding or excluding the whole set
of ground atoms with the same predicate symbol anyway.
Next, we need to define the reduction that makes it possible to properly transfer infor-
mation from an MKNF model of the bottom of K, and use it to simplify the top of K.
Definition 5 (Splitting Set Reduct)
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K = 〈O,P〉 and X ∈ M. The
splitting set reduct of K relative to U and X is a hybrid knowledge base eU (K, X) =
〈tU (O), eU (P , X)〉, where eU (P , X) consists of all rules r′ such that there exists a rule
r ∈ tU (P) with the following properties: X |= pi({ L ∈ B(r) | pr(L) ⊆ U }), H(r′) =
H(r), and B(r′) = { L ∈ B(r) | pr(L) ⊆ P \ U }.
This leads us to the notion of a solution to K w.r.t. a splitting set U .
Definition 6 (Solution w.r.t. a Splitting Set)
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K. A solution to K w.r.t. U is a pair
of MKNF interpretations 〈X,Y 〉 such that X is an MKNF model of bU (K) and Y is an
MKNF model of eU (K, X).
The splitting theorem now ensures that solutions toK w.r.t. any splitting set U are in one
to one correspondence with the MKNF models of K.
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Theorem 7 (Splitting Theorem for Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases)
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K. Then M is an MKNF model of K
if and only if M = X ∩ Y for some solution 〈X,Y 〉 to K w.r.t. U .
Proof
See Appendix B, page 39.
This result makes it possible to characterise an MKNF model of a hybrid knowledge
base in terms of a pair of MKNF models of two layers inside it, such that, as far as the
MKNF semantics is concerned, the first layer is independent of the second. If instead of a
single splitting set we consider a sequence of such sets, we can divide a hybrid knowledge
in a sequence of layers, keeping similar properties as in the case of a single splitting set.
Definition 8 (Splitting Sequence)
A splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge base K is a monotone, continuous sequence
〈Uα〉α<µ of splitting sets for K such that
⋃
α<µ Uα = P.
The first layer ofK relative to such a splitting sequence is the part ofK that only contains
predicates from U0. Formally, this is exactly the hybrid knowledge base bU0(K). Further-
more, for every ordinal α + 1 < µ, the corresponding layer of K is the part of K that
contains predicates from Uα+1 \ Uα, and, in addition, predicate symbols from Uα are al-
lowed to appear in rule bodies. Given our notation this can be written as tUα(bUα+1(K)).
The following definition uses these observations and combines them with suitable reduc-
tions to introduce a solution w.r.t. a splitting sequence.
Definition 9 (Solution w.r.t. a Splitting Sequence)
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge base K. A solution to K
w.r.t. U is a sequence 〈Xα〉α<µ of MKNF interpretations such that
1. X0 is an MKNF model of bU0(K);
2. For any ordinal α such that α+ 1 < µ, Xα+1 is an MKNF model of
eUα
(
bUα+1(K),
⋂
η≤αXη
)
;
3. For any limit ordinal α < µ, Xα = I.
The splitting sequence theorem now guarantees a one to one correspondence between
MKNF models and solutions w.r.t. a splitting sequence.
Theorem 10 (Splitting Sequence Theorem for Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases)
Let 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge baseK. ThenM is an MKNF
model ofK if and only ifM =
⋂
α<µXα for some solution 〈Xα〉α<µ toKw.r.t. 〈Uα〉α<µ.
Proof
See Appendix C, page 45.
A hybrid knowledge base can be split in a number of different ways. For example, ∅ and
P are splitting sets for any hybrid knowledge base and sequences such as 〈P〉, 〈∅,P〉 are
splitting sequences for any hybrid knowledge base. The following example shows a more
elaborate splitting sequence for the Cargo Import knowledge base.
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Example 11 (Splitting the Cargo Import Knowledge Base)
Consider the hybrid knowledge baseK = 〈O,P〉 presented in Fig. 1. One of the nontrivial
splitting sequences for K is U = 〈U0, U1, U2, U3,P〉, where
U0 = {Commodity/1,EdibleVegetable/1,Tomato/1,CherryTomato/1,GrapeTomato/1,
HTSCode/2,HTSChapter/2,HTSHeading/2,Bulk/1,Prepackaged/1,TariffCharge/2,
ShpmtCommod/2, ShpmtImporter/2, ShpmtDeclHTSCode/2, ShpmtProducer/2,
ShpmtCountry/2 }
U1 = U0 ∪ {AdmissibleImporter/1, SuspectedBadGuy/1,ApprovedImporterOf/2 }
U2 = U1 ∪ {RegisteredProducer/2,EUCountry/1,EURegisteredProducer/1,CommodCountry/2,
ExpeditableImporter/2, LowRiskEUCommodity/1 }
U3 = U2 ∪ {CompliantShpmt/1,Random/1,RandomInspection/1,PartialInspection/1,
FullInspection/1 } .
This splitting sequence splits K in four layers. The first layer contains all ontological
knowledge regarding commodity types as well as information about shipments. The sec-
ond layer contains rules that use information from the first layer together with internal
records to classify importers. The third layer contains axioms with geographic classifica-
tion, information about registered producers and, based on information about commodities
and importers from the first two layers, it defines low risk commodities coming from the
European Union. The final layer contains rules for deciding which shipments should be
inspected based on information from previous layers.
3.2 Update Operator
With the concepts and results related to splitting hybrid knowledge bases from the previous
subsection, we are now ready to examine the constraints under which a plausible modular
update semantics for a hybrid knowledge base can be defined. Obviously, this is the case
with hybrid knowledge bases that contain either only ontology axioms, or only rules. We
call such knowledge bases basic, and define the dynamic MKNF model for basic dynamic
knowledge bases by referring to the classical and rule update semantics defined in Sect. 2.
Definition 12 (Dynamic MKNF Model of a Basic Dynamic Hybrid Knowledge Base)
We say a hybrid knowledge base K = 〈O,P〉 is O-based if P contains only positive
facts; P-based if O is empty; basic if it is either O-based or P-based. A dynamic hybrid
knowledge base K = 〈Ki〉i<n is O-based if for all i < n, Ki is O-based; P-based if for
all i < n, Ki is P-based; basic if it is either O-based or P-based.
An MKNF interpretation M is a dynamic MKNF model of a basic dynamic hybrid
knowledge base K = 〈Ki〉i<n, where Ki = 〈Oi,Pi〉, if either K is O-based and M
is the minimal change update model of 〈ζ (Oi) ∪ Pi〉i<n, or K is P-based and M =
{ J ∈ I | I ⊆ J } for some dynamic stable model I of 〈Pi〉i<n.
As can be seen, our definition is slightly more general than described above, as in the
case of O-based knowledge bases it allows the program part to contain positive facts. This
amounts to the reasonable assumption that positive facts in a logic program carry the same
meaning as the corresponding ground first-order atom. As will be seen in the following,
this allows us to extend the class of basic hybrid knowledge bases and define dynamic
MKNF models for it. To this end, we utilise the splitting-related concepts from the previous
subsection. Their natural generalisation for dynamic hybrid knowledge bases follows.
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Definition 13 (Splitting Set and Splitting Sequence)
A set of predicate symbols U is a splitting set for a dynamic hybrid knowledge base K =
〈Ki〉i<n if for all i < n, U is a splitting set for Ki.
The dynamic hybrid knowledge base 〈bU (Ki)〉i<n is called the bottom of K relative to
U and denoted by bU (K). The dynamic hybrid knowledge base 〈tU (Ki)〉i<n is called the
top of K relative to U and denoted by tU (K). Given some X ∈ M, the dynamic hybrid
knowledge base 〈eU (Ki, X)〉i<n is called the splitting set reduct of K relative to U andX
and denoted by eU (K, X).
A sequence of sets of predicate symbols U is a splitting sequence for K if for all i < n,
U is a splitting sequence for Ki.
In the static case, given a splitting set U , the splitting set theorem guarantees that an
MKNF model M of a hybrid knowledge base K is an intersection of an MKNF model X
of bU (K) and of an MKNF model Y of eU (K, X). In the dynamic case, we can use this
correspondence to define a dynamic MKNF model. More specifically, we can say that M
is a dynamic MKNF model of a dynamic hybrid knowledge base K if M is an intersection
of a dynamic MKNF model X of bU (K) and of a dynamic MKNF model Y of eU (K, X).
For the definition to be sound, we need to guarantee that X and Y are defined. In other
words, K has to be such that both bU (K) and eU (K, X) are basic. When we move to the
more general case of a splitting sequence U = 〈Uα〉α<µ, what we need to ensure is that
bU0(K) is basic and for any ordinal α such that α + 1 < µ, eUα(bUα+1(K),
⋂
η<αXη) is
also basic. A class of dynamic hybrid knowledge bases that satisfies these conditions can
be defined as follows:
Definition 14 (Updatable Dynamic Hybrid Knowledge Base)
Let U be a set of predicate symbols. We say a hybrid knowledge base K is O-reducible
relative to U if all rules r from P are positive and pr(B(r)) ⊆ U ; P-reducible relative to
U if O is empty; reducible relative to U if it is either O-reducible or P-reducible relative
to U . A dynamic hybrid knowledge base K = 〈Ki〉i<n is O-reducible relative to U if for
all i < n, Ki is O-reducible relative to U ; P-reducible relative to U if for all i < n, Ki is
P-reducible relative to U ; reducible relative to U if it is either O-reducible or P-reducible
relative to U .
Let K be a (dynamic) hybrid knowledge base and U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence
for K. We say U is update-enabling for K if bU0(K) is reducible relative to ∅ and for any
α such that α+ 1 < µ, the hybrid knowledge base tUα(bUα+1(K)) is reducible relative to
Uα. We say K is updatable if some update-enabling splitting sequence for K exists.
The following proposition now guarantees the property of updatable dynamic hybrid
knowledge bases that we discussed above.
Proposition 15 (Layers of an Updatable Dynamic Hybrid Knowledge Base are Basic)
Let U be an update-enabling splitting sequence for a dynamic hybrid knowledge base K
and X ∈ M. Then bU0(K) is a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base and for any ordinal
α such that α+1 < µ, eUα(bUα+1(K), X) is also a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base.
Proof
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See Appendix F, page 56.
This result paves the way to the following definition of a solution to an updatable dy-
namic hybrid knowledge base together with the notion of a dynamic MKNF model w.r.t. an
updatable splitting sequence.
Definition 16 (Solution to an Updatable Dynamic Hybrid Knowledge Base)
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be an update-enabling splitting sequence for a dynamic hybrid knowl-
edge base K. A solution to K w.r.t. U is a sequence of MKNF interpretations 〈Xα〉α<µ
such that
1. X0 is a dynamic MKNF model of bU0(K);
2. For any ordinal α such that α+ 1 < µ, Xα+1 is a dynamic MKNF model of
eUα
(
bUα+1(K),
⋂
η≤αXη
)
;
3. For any limit ordinal α < µ, Xα = I.
We say that an MKNF interpretation M is a dynamic MKNF model of K w.r.t. U if M =⋂
α<µXα for some solution 〈Xα〉α<µ to K w.r.t. U .
The last step required to define a dynamic MKNF model of an updatable dynamic hybrid
knowledge base, without the need to refer to a context of a particular splitting sequence,
is to ensure that Def. 12 of a dynamic MKNF model for basic dynamic hybrid knowledge
bases is properly generalised. The following proposition guarantees that the set of dynamic
MKNF models is independent of a particular update-enabling splitting sequence.
Proposition 17 (Solution Independence)
Let U, V be update-enabling splitting sequences for a dynamic hybrid knowledge base K.
Then M is a dynamic MKNF model of K w.r.t. U if and only if M is a dynamic MKNF
model of K w.r.t. V .
Proof
See Appendix F, page 60.
If K is a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base, then it can be verified easily that dy-
namic MKNF models ofK, as originally defined in Def. 12, coincide with dynamic MKNF
models of K w.r.t. the splitting sequence 〈P〉. We obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 18 (Compatibility with Def. 12)
Let K be a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base and U be a splitting sequence for K.
Then M is a dynamic MKNF model of K if and only if M is a dynamic MKNF model of
K w.r.t. U .
Proof
See Appendix F, page 63.
We can now safely introduce the dynamic MKNF model for any updatable dynamic
hybrid knowledge base as follows:
Definition 19 (Dynamic MKNF Model of Updatable Dynamic Hybrid Knowledge Base)
An MKNF interpretation M is a dynamic MKNF model of an updatable dynamic hybrid
knowledge base K if M is a dynamic MKNF model of K w.r.t. some update-enabling
splitting sequence for K.
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3.3 Properties and Use
The purpose of this section is to twofold. First, we establish the most basic properties of the
defined update semantics, relating it to the static MKNF semantics and the adopted classi-
cal and rule update semantics and showing that it respects one of the most widely accepted
principles behind update semantics in general, the principle of primacy of new informa-
tion. Second, we illustrate its usefulness by considering updates of the hybrid knowledge
base presented in Example 1.
The first result shows that our update semantics generalises the static MKNF semantics.
Theorem 20 (Generalisation of MKNF Models)
Let K be an updatable hybrid knowledge base and M be an MKNF interpretation. Then
M is a dynamic MKNF model of 〈K〉 if and only if M is an MKNF model of K.
Proof
See Appendix F, page 63.
It also generalises the classical and rule update semantics it is based on.
Theorem 21 (Generalisation of Minimal Change Update Semantics)
Let 〈Ki〉i<n, where Ki = 〈Oi,Pi〉, be a dynamic hybrid knowledge base such that Pi is
empty for all i < n. Then M is a dynamic MKNF model of 〈Ki〉i<n if and only if M is
the minimal change update model of 〈ζ (Oi)〉i<n.
Proof
See Appendix F, page 63.
Theorem 22 (Generalisation of Dynamic Stable Model Semantics)
Let K = 〈Ki〉i<n, where Ki = 〈Oi,Pi〉, be a dynamic hybrid knowledge base such
that Oi is empty for all i < n. Then M is a dynamic MKNF model of K if and only if
M = { J ∈ I | I ⊆ J } for some dynamic stable model I of 〈Pi〉i<n.
Proof
See Appendix F, page 64.
Besides, the semantics respects the principle of primacy of new information (Dalal 1988).
Theorem 23 (Principle of Primacy of New Information)
Let K = 〈Ki〉i<n be an updatable dynamic hybrid knowledge base with n > 0 and M be
a dynamic MKNF model of K. Then M |= pi(Kn−1).
Proof
See Appendix F, page 64.
The following example illustrates how the semantics can be used in the Cargo Imports
domain to incorporate new, conflicting information into a hybrid knowledge base.
Example 24 (Updating the Cargo Import Knowledge Base)
The hybrid knowledge base K in Fig. 1 has a single MKNF model M . We shortly sum-
marise what is entailed by this model. First, since the shipments s1 , s2 , s3 differ in the kind
of tomatoes and their packaging, each of them is associated a different tariff charge. The
HTS codes of commodities inside all three shipments match the declared HTS codes, so
CompliantShipment(si ) is entailed for all i. The rules for importers imply that while both
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* * * bU0(K) * * *
Commodity ≡ (∃HTSCode.⊤) EdibleVegetable ≡ (∃HTSChapter. { ‘07’ })
CherryTomato ≡ (∃HTSCode. { ‘07020020’ }) Tomato ≡ (∃HTSHeading. { ‘0702’ })
GrapeTomato ≡ (∃HTSCode. { ‘07020010’ }) Tomato ⊑ EdibleVegetable
CherryTomato ⊑ Tomato GrapeTomato ⊑ Tomato
CherryTomato ⊓ Bulk ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $0 }) CherryTomato ⊓ GrapeTomato ⊑ ⊥
GrapeTomato ⊓ Bulk ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $40 }) Bulk ⊓ Prepackaged ⊑ ⊥
CherryTomato ⊓ Prepackaged ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $50 })
GrapeTomato ⊓ Prepackaged ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $100 })
〈s1 , c1 〉 : ShpmtCommod 〈s1 , ‘07020020’〉 : ShpmtDeclHTSCode
〈s1 , i1 〉 : ShpmtImporter c1 : CherryTomato c1 : Bulk
〈s2 , c2 〉 : ShpmtCommod 〈s2 , ‘07020020’〉 : ShpmtDeclHTSCode
〈s2 , i2 〉 : ShpmtImporter c2 : CherryTomato c2 : Prepackaged
〈s2 , portugal〉 : ShpmtCountry
〈s3 , c3 〉 : ShpmtCommod 〈s3 , ‘07020010’〉 : ShpmtDeclHTSCode
〈s3 , i3 〉 : ShpmtImporter c3 : GrapeTomato c3 : Bulk
〈s3 , portugal〉 : ShpmtCountry 〈s3 , p1 〉 : ShpmtProducer
* * * tU0(bU1(K)) * * *
AdmissibleImporter(I)← ∼SuspectedBadGuy(I).
SuspectedBadGuy(i1 ).
ApprovedImporterOf(i2 , C)← EdibleVegetable(C).
ApprovedImporterOf(i3 , C)← GrapeTomato(C).
* * * tU1(bU2(K)) * * *
CommodCountry(C,Country) ← ShpmtCommod(S,C),ShpmtCountry(S,Country).
ExpeditableImporter(C, I)← AdmissibleImporter(I),ApprovedImporterOf(I,C).
EURegisteredProducer ≡ (∃RegisteredProducer.EUCountry)
LowRiskEUCommodity ≡ (∃ExpeditableImporter.⊤) ⊓ (∃CommodCountry.EUCountry)
〈p1 , portugal 〉 : RegisteredProducer 〈p2 , slovakia〉 : RegisteredProducer
portugal : EUCountry slovakia : EUCountry
* * * tU2(bU3(K)) * * *
CompliantShpmt(S) ← ShpmtCommod(S,C),HTSCode(C,D),ShpmtDeclHTSCode(S,D).
RandomInspection(S)← ShpmtCommod(S,C),Random(C).
PartialInspection(S)← RandomInspection(S).
PartialInspection(S)← ShpmtCommod(S,C),∼LowRiskEUCommodity(C).
FullInspection(S)← ∼CompliantShpmt(S).
FullInspection(S)← ShpmtCommod(S,C),Tomato(C),ShpmtCountry(S, slovakia).
Fig. 2. Layers of the Hybrid Knowledge Base for Cargo Imports
AdmissibleImporter(i2 ) and AdmissibleImporter(i3 ) are true, AdmissibleImporter(i1 ) is
not true because i1 is a suspected bad guy. It also follows thatApprovedImporterOf(i2 , c2 )
and ApprovedImporterOf(i3 , c3 ) hold and because of that ExpeditableImporter(c2 , i2 )
and ExpeditableImporter(c3 , i3 ) are also true. Both of these shipments come from a Eu-
ropean country, so c2 and c3 belong to LowRiskEUCommodity. But this is not true for c1
since there is no expeditable importer for it. Consequently, PartialInspection(s1 ) holds.
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* * * bU0(K
′) * * *
Commodity ≡ (∃HTSCode.⊤) EdibleVegetable ≡ (∃HTSChapter. { ‘07’ })
CherryTomato ≡ (∃HTSCode. { ‘07020020’ }) Tomato ≡ (∃HTSHeading. { ‘0702’ })
GrapeTomato ≡ (∃HTSCode. { ‘07020010’ }) Tomato ⊑ EdibleVegetable
CherryTomato ⊑ Tomato GrapeTomato ⊑ Tomato
CherryTomato ⊓ Bulk ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $0 }) CherryTomato ⊓ GrapeTomato ⊑ ⊥
GrapeTomato ⊓ Bulk ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $40 }) Bulk ⊓ Prepackaged ⊑ ⊥
CherryTomato ⊓ Prepackaged ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $50 })
GrapeTomato ⊓ Prepackaged ≡ (∃TariffCharge. { $100 })
c1 : GrapeTomato
* * * tU0(bU1(K
′)) * * *
∼ApprovedImporterOf(i2 , C)← Tomato(C).
* * * tU1(bU2(K
′)) * * *
EURegisteredProducer ≡ (∃RegisteredProducer.EUCountry)
LowRiskEUCommodity ≡ (∃ExpeditableImporter.⊤) ⊓ (∃CommodCountry.EUCountry)
c3 : (¬LowRiskEUCommodity)
* * * tU2(bU3(K
′)) * * *
∼PartialInspection(S)← ShpmtProducer(S, P ),EURegisteredProducer(P ).
Fig. 3. Layers of the Update to the Hybrid Knowledge Base for Cargo Imports
We now consider an update caused by several independent events in order to illustrate
different aspects of our hybrid update semantics.
Suppose that during the partial inspection of s1 , grape tomatoes are found instead of
cherry tomatoes. Second, we suppose that i2 is no longer an approved importer for any kind
of tomatoes due to a history of mis-filing. Third, due to rat infestation on the boat with ship-
ment s3 , c3 is no longer considered a low risk commodity. Finally, due to workload con-
straints, partial inspections for shipments with commodities from a producer registered in
a country of the European Union will be waived. These events lead to the following update
K′ = 〈O′,P ′〉: whereO′ contains c1 : GrapeTomato and c3 : (¬LowRiskEUCommodity)
as well as all TBox axioms from O,5 and P ′ contains the following rules:6
∼ApprovedImporterOf(i2 , C) ← Tomato(C).
∼PartialInspection(S)← ShpmtProducer(S, P ),EURegisteredProducer(P ).
Note that the splitting sequence U defined in Example 11 is update-enabling for the dy-
namic hybrid knowledge base 〈K,K′〉. The four nonempty layers of K are listed in Fig. 2.
The first layer, bU0(K) contains only ontology axioms, and so is O-reducible relative to ∅.
The second and fourth layers (tU0(bU1(K)) and tU2(bU3(K))) contain only rules and so are
5 We reinclude all TBox axioms in O′ in order to keep them static throughout the example.
6 We assume that all rule variables are DL-safe and rules are grounded prior to applying our theory.
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P-reducible relative to U0 and U2, respectively. Finally, the third layer tU1(bU2(K)) con-
tains a mixture of rules and ontology axioms, but all the rules are positive and all predicate
symbols of all rule body literals belong to U1, so the layer is O-reducible relative to U1.
The layers of the updating hybrid knowledge baseK′ are shown in Fig. 3. It can be easily
verified that they satisfy the same reducibility criteria, so U is indeed an update-enabling
sequence for 〈K,K′〉. In order to arrive at a dynamic MKNF model of 〈K,K′〉 with respect
toU , a dynamic MKNF model of each layer is computed separately and models of previous
layers serve to “import” information to the current layer.
In our case, we first need to find the minimal change update model X0 of the first layer
of K updated by the first layer of K′. Due to the TBox axioms, this results in c1 no longer
being a member of CherryTomato. The HTS code of c1 also changes to ‘07020010’. Note
that the conflict between old and new knowledge is properly resolved by the minimal
change update semantics.
Subsequently, the dynamic stable model semantics is used to find the dynamic MKNF
model X1 of the second layer of K updated by the second layer of K′. The rule update
results in i2 no longer being an approved importer for c2 . As before, the conflict that arose
is resolved by the rule update semantics.
Given the dynamic MKNF models of the first two layers, the model of the third layer of
K is now different because i2 is no longer an expeditable importer of c2 . As a consequence,
c2 is no longer a member of the concept LowRiskEUCommodity. Also, due to the update
of the third layer, c3 is also not a member of LowRiskEUCommodity. The conflicting
situation was again resolved by the minimal change update operator and results in the
dynamic MKNF model X2 of the third layer.
Finally, due to the changes in all three previous layers, the rules in the fourth layer now
imply that CompliantShpmt(s1 ) does not hold and, as a consequence, FullInspection(s1 )
holds. Also, PartialInspection(s2 ) holds because c2 is not a low risk commodity. But even
though c3 is also not a low risk commodity, PartialInspection(s3 ) does not hold. This is
due to the rule update of the fourth layer according to which the inspection of s3 must be
waived because s3 comes from an EU registered producer.
4 Discussion
The class of updatable hybrid knowledge bases for which we defined an update semantics
in the previous section is closely related to multi-context systems (Brewka and Eiter 2007).
Each layer of a hybrid knowledge base relative to a particular update-enabling splitting
sequence can be viewed as a context together with all its bridge rules. At the same time,
the constraints we impose guarantee that each such context either contains only rules, so
the context logic can be the stable model semantics, or it contains only DL axioms so that
first-order logic can be used as its logic. On the other hand, different splitting sequences
induce different multi-context systems, though their overall semantics stays the same. We
believe that a further study of this close relationship may bring about new insights.
Another direction in which the proposed framework can be generalised is by letting
the ontology and rule update operators be given as parameters instead of using a fixed
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pair.7 This seems to have even more appeal given the fact that no general consensus has
been reached in the community regarding the “right way” to perform rule updates, and
the situation with ontology update operators also seems to be similar. Although Winslett’s
operator has been used to deal with ABox updates (Liu et al. 2006; Giacomo et al. 2006),
its use for dealing with TBox updates has recently been criticised (Calvanese et al. 2010;
Slota and Leite 2010b) and a number of considerably different methods for dealing with
TBox evolution have been proposed (Qi et al. 2006; Qi and Du 2009; Yang et al. 2009;
Calvanese et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2010), many tailored to a specific Description Logic.
To sum up, the contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we generalised the splitting
theorems for Logic Programs (Lifschitz and Turner 1994) to the case of Hybrid MKNF
Knowledge Bases (Motik and Rosati 2007). This makes it possible to divide a hybrid knowl-
edge base into layers and guarantees that its overall semantics can be reconstructed from
the semantics of layers inside it. Second, we used the theorem and related notions to iden-
tify a class of hybrid knowledge bases for which we successfully defined an update se-
mantics, based on a modular combination of a classical and a rule update semantics. We
showed that our semantics properly generalises the semantics it is based on, particularly
the static semantics of Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases (Motik and Rosati 2007), the clas-
sical minimal change update semantics (Winslett 1990), and the refined dynamic stable
model semantics for rule updates (Alferes et al. 2005). We then illustrated on an example
motivated by a real world application how the defined semantics deals with nontrivial up-
dates, automatically resolving conflicts and propagating new information across the hybrid
knowledge base.
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Appendix A Proofs of Auxiliary Propositions
A.1 Restricted MKNF Interpretations
Proposition 25
Let φ be an MKNF sentence, U ⊆ P be a set of predicate symbols such that U ⊇ pr(φ)
and 〈I,M,N〉 be an MKNF structure. Then:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒
〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ .
Proof
We will prove by structural induction on φ:
1◦ If φ is a ground atom P (t1, t2, . . . , tn), then P ∈ pr(φ), so P ∈ U . The following
chain of equivalences now proves the claim:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ P (t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ I ⇐⇒ P (t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ I
[U ]
⇐⇒
〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ ;
2◦ If φ is of the form ¬ψ, then pr(φ) = pr(ψ), so U ⊇ pr(ψ). Hence we can use the
inductive hypothesis for ψ as follows:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ 〈I,M,N〉 6|= ψ ⇐⇒
〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
6|= ψ
⇐⇒
〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ ;
3◦ If φ is of the form φ1 ∧ φ2, then pr(φ) = pr(φ1) ∪ pr(φ2), so we easily obtain both
U ⊇ pr(φ1) and U ⊇ pr(φ2). Applying the inductive hypothesis to φ1 and φ2 now
yields the claim:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ 〈I,M,N〉 |= φ1 ∧ 〈I,M,N〉 |= φ2
⇐⇒
〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ1 ∧
〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ2
⇐⇒
〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ ;
4◦ If φ is of the form ∃x : ψ, then for any c ∈ ∆, pr(φ) = pr(ψ) = pr(ψ[c/x]), so
U ⊇ pr(ψ[c/x]). Hence we can use the inductive hypothesis for the formulaeψ[c/x]
as follows:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ (∃c ∈ ∆)(〈I,M,N〉 |= ψ[c/x])
⇐⇒ (∃c ∈ ∆)
(〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= ψ[c/x]
)
⇐⇒
〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ ;
5◦ If φ is of the form Kψ, then pr(φ) = pr(ψ), so U ⊇ pr(ψ). The claim now follows
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from the inductive hypothesis for ψ:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ (∀J ∈M) (〈J,M,N〉 |= ψ)
⇐⇒ (∀J ∈M)
(〈
J [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= ψ
)
⇐⇒
(
∀J ∈M [U ]
)(〈
J,M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= ψ
)
⇐⇒
〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ ;
6◦ If φ is of the form notψ, then pr(φ) = pr(ψ), so U ⊇ pr(ψ). The claim follows
similarly as in the previous case:
〈I,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ (∃J ∈ N) (〈J,M,N〉 6|= ψ)
⇐⇒ (∃J ∈ N)
(〈
J [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
6|= ψ
)
⇐⇒
(
∃J ∈ N [U ]
)(〈
J,M [U ], N [U ]
〉
6|= ψ
)
⇐⇒
〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ .
Corollary 26
Let T be a set of formulae, U be a set of predicate symbols such that U ⊇ pr(T ) and
M,N ∈ M be such that they coincide on U . Then
M |= T ⇐⇒ N |= T .
Proof
We will prove the equivalence only in one direction, the proof of the second direction can
be written analogically.
Suppose that M |= T . Then for every φ ∈ T and all I ∈ M we have 〈I,M,M〉 |= φ.
We want to show that N |= T . Let’s pick some φ ∈ T and some J ∈ N . Since M [U ] =
N [U ], there must be some I ∈M such that I [U ] = J [U ]. By assumption, U contains pr(φ)
and 〈I,M,M〉 |= φ, so Proposition 25 yields〈
I [U ],M [U ],M [U ]
〉
|= φ .
As mentioned above, I [U ] = J [U ] and M [U ] = N [U ], so〈
J [U ], N [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ .
Another application of Proposition 25 now yields 〈J,N,N〉 |= φ and since J and φ were
chosen arbitrarily, we can conclude that N |= T .
Proposition 27
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M,N ∈ M. Then the following implications
hold:
(1) If M ⊆ N , then M [U ] ⊆ N [U ].
(2) If M = N , then M [U ] = N [U ].
(3) If M ⊆ N and M [U ] ( N [U ], then M ( N .
Proof
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(1) Follows by definition of M [U ] and N [U ].
(2) This is a direct consequence of (1).
(3) Suppose M ⊆ N and M [U ] ( N [U ]. Then there must be some J ∈ N such that
J [U ] /∈M [U ]. Consequently, J /∈M and so M must be a proper subset of N .
A.2 Saturated MKNF Interpretations
An interesting class of MKNF interpretations are saturated MKNF interpretations. As we
will see, all MKNF models of some formula or set of formulae are saturated in a certain
sense. Furthermore, a strengthened version of Proposition 27 can be shown for saturated
MKNF interpretations, with implications replaced by equivalences. In this subsection we
formally define the class of saturated MKNF interpretations and then we prove some of
their properties.
Definition 28 (Saturated MKNF Interpretation)
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M ∈ M. We say an M is saturated relative to U
if for every interpretation I ∈ I the following holds:
If I [U ] ∈M [U ], then I ∈M.
Interestingly, all MKNF models of a theory T are saturated relative to the set of predicate
symbols relevant to T :
Proposition 29
Let U be a set of predicate symbols, T be an MKNF theory such that U ⊇ pr(T ) and M
be an MKNF model of T . Then M is saturated relative to U .
Proof
Suppose M is not saturated relative to U . Then there is some I ∈ I such that I [U ] ∈
M [U ] and I /∈ M . Let M ′ = M ∪ { I }. M is an MKNF model of T , so by definition
〈I ′,M ′,M〉 6|= T for some I ′ ∈ M ′. But I ′[U ] ∈ M ′[U ] = M [U ], so there must be some
I ′′ ∈M such that I ′′[U ] = I ′[U ]. By two applications of Proposition 25 we now obtain
〈I ′,M ′,M〉 6|= T =⇒
〈
I ′[U ],M ′[U ],M [U ]
〉
6|= T =⇒ 〈I ′′,M,M〉 6|= T .
This is in conflict with the assumption that M is an MKNF model of T .
Proposition 30
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M,N ∈ M be such that M saturated relative to
U . Then the following equivalences hold:
(1) M = N if and only if M ⊆ N and M [U ] ⊇ N [U ].
(2) M ( N if and only if M ⊆ N and M [U ] ( N [U ].
Proof
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(1) The direct implication follows from Proposition 27. We will prove the converse im-
plication. Suppose M [U ] ⊇ N [U ] and I ∈ N . We immediately obtain I [U ] ∈ M [U ]
and since M is saturated relative to U , we can conclude that I ∈M .
(2) For the direct implication suppose that M ( N . Then there is some I ∈ N such
that I /∈M . Since M is saturated relative to U , we obtain that I [U ] /∈M [U ]. Conse-
quently, M [U ] is a proper subset of N [U ]. The converse implication is a cosequence
of Proposition 27(3).
Proposition 31
Let U be a set of predicate symbols andM,N ∈ M be such that N is saturated relative to
U . Then:
(1) M ⊆ N if and only if M [U ] ⊆ N [U ].
(2) If M [U ] ( N [U ], then M ( N .
Proof
(1) The direct implication follows from Proposition 27(1). We will prove the converse
implication. Suppose M [U ] ⊆ N [U ] and I ∈ M . We immediately obtain I [U ] ∈
M [U ], hence also I [U ] ∈ N [U ]. Since N is saturated relative to U , we can conclude
that I ∈ N . Consequently,M ⊆ N .
(2) This is a consequence of (1) and Proposition 27(3).
Corollary 32
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M,N be MKNF interpretations that are both
saturated relative to U . Then the following equivalences hold:
(1) M ⊆ N if and only if M [U ] ⊆ N [U ].
(2) M = N if and only if M [U ] = N [U ].
(3) M ( N if and only if M [U ] ( N [U ].
Proof
(1) Follows from Proposition 31(1).
(2) This is a consequence of (1).
(3) This is a consequence of (1) and (2).
Definition 33
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M ∈ M. Then we introduce the following nota-
tion:
σ(M,U) =
{
I ∈ I
∣∣∣ I [U ] ∈M [U ] }
Proposition 34
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M,N ∈ M. Then the following conditions are
equivalent:
1. N = σ(M,U);
2. N coincides with M on U and is saturated relative to U .
3. N is the greatest among all N ′ ∈M coinciding with M on U ;
Furthermore, if N satisfies one of the conditions above, then M ⊆ N .
Proof
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We will prove that 1. implies 2., 2. implies 3. and finally that 3. implies 1.
Suppose N = σ(M,U). Then
N [U ] = { I [U ] | I ∈ I ∧ I [U ] ∈M [U ] } = M [U ] ,
so N coincides with M on U . Furthermore, any I ∈ I with I [U ] ∈ N [U ] must also satisfy
I [U ] ∈M [U ]. Thus, I ∈ N , so N is saturated relative to U . This shows that 1. implies 2.
To show that 2. implies 3., suppose N coincides with M on U and is saturated relative
to U . Suppose N ′ ∈ M coincides with M on U and I ∈ N ′. Then
I [U ] ∈ N ′[U ] = M [U ] = N [U ] ,
so, since N is saturated relative to U , we can conclude that I belongs to N . Consequently,
N ′ is contained in N , so N is the greatest among all N ′ ∈M coinciding with M on U .
Finally, suppose N is the greatest among all N ′ ∈ M coinciding with M on U . It can
be easily seen that σ(M,U) coincides with M on U , so σ(M,U) must be a subset of N .
It remains to show that N is a subset of σ(M,U). But that is an easy consequence of the
fact that for any I ∈ N , I [U ] must belong to M [U ].
It still remains to show thatM is a subset ofN ifN satisfies one of the above conditions.
We already know that the conditions are equivalent, so we only need to consider one of
them. So supposeN = σ(M,U) (condition 1.). It can be easily seen from the definition of
σ(M,U) that every I ∈M belongs also to N . Hence, M is a subset of N .
Proposition 35
Let U1, U2 be sets of predicate symbols and M ∈M. Then
σ(σ(M,U1), U2) = σ(M,U1 ∩ U2) .
Proof
Consider the following sequence of equivalences:
I ∈ σ(σ(M,U1), U2) ⇐⇒ I
[U2] ∈ σ(M,U1)
[U2]
⇐⇒ (∃J ∈ σ(M,U1))(J
[U2] = I [U2])
⇐⇒ (∃J ∈ I)((∃K ∈M)(K [U1] = J [U1] ∧ J [U2] = I [U2])
⇐⇒ (∃K ∈M)(∃J ∈ I)(J [U1] = K [U1] ∧ J [U2] = I [U2]) .
Moreover, we also obtain the following:
I ∈ σ(M,U1 ∩ U2)⇐⇒ (∃K ∈M)(K
[U1∩U2] = I [U1∩U2]) .
So it remains to show that
(∃J ∈ I)(J [U1] = K [U1] ∧ J [U2] = I [U2])
holds if and only if
K [U1∩U2] = I [U1∩U2] .
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Indeed, if such a J exists, then for every ground atoms p the following holds:
p ∈ K [U1∩U2] ⇐⇒ p ∈ K ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1 ∩ U2
⇐⇒ (p ∈ K ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1) ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U2 ⇐⇒ p ∈ K
[U1] ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U2
⇐⇒ p ∈ J [U1] ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U2 ⇐⇒ (p ∈ J ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U2) ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1
⇐⇒ p ∈ J [U2] ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1 ⇐⇒ p ∈ I
[U2] ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1
⇐⇒ p ∈ I ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1 ∩ U2 ⇐⇒ p ∈ I
[U1∩U2]
On the other hand, if the other condition holds, then for
J = { p ∈ K | pr(p) ⊆ U1 } ∪ { p ∈ I | pr(p) ⊆ U2 }
and any ground atom p we obtain
p ∈ J [U1] ⇐⇒ p ∈ J ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1
⇐⇒ (p ∈ K ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1) ∨ (p ∈ I ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1 ∩ U2)
⇐⇒ (p ∈ K ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1) ∨ p ∈ I
[U1∩U2]
⇐⇒ (p ∈ K ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1) ∨ p ∈ K
[U1∩U2]
⇐⇒ (p ∈ K ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1) ∨ (p ∈ K ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1 ∩ U2)
⇐⇒ p ∈ K ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1
⇐⇒ p ∈ K [U1]
and also
p ∈ J [U2] ⇐⇒ p ∈ J ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U2
⇐⇒ (p ∈ K ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1 ∩ U2) ∨ (p ∈ I ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U2)
⇐⇒ p ∈ K [U1∩U2] ∨ (p ∈ I ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U2)
⇐⇒ p ∈ I [U1∩U2] ∨ (p ∈ I ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U2)
⇐⇒ (p ∈ I ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U1 ∩ U2) ∨ (p ∈ I ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U2)
⇐⇒ p ∈ I ∧ pr(p) ⊆ U2
⇐⇒ p ∈ I [U2] .
Proposition 36
Let U1, U2 ⊆ P be sets of atoms such that U1 ⊆ U2 and M ∈M. Then
σ(M,U2)
[U1] = M [U1] .
Proof
First suppose that I belongs to σ(M,U2)[U1]. Then for some J ∈ σ(M,U2) we have
I = J [U1], so
I = { p ∈ J | pr(p) ⊆ U1 } . (A1)
Also, since J belongs to σ(M,U2), there must be some K ∈ M such that K [U2] = J [U2],
which means that for any ground atom p with pr(p) ⊆ U2 we have p ∈ J ⇐⇒ p ∈ K .
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This, together with (A1) and the assumption that U1 is a subset of U2, implies that
I = { p ∈ K | pr(p) ⊆ U1 } .
Thus, I belongs to M [U1].
The converse inclusion follows from the fact thatM is a subset of σ(M,U2) (see Propo-
sition 34).
Lemma 37
Let U1, U2 be sets of predicate symbols such that U1 is a subset of U2 and let X ∈ M. If
X is saturated relative to U1, then it is saturated relative to U2.
Proof
Suppose X is saturated relative to U1 and I ∈ I is such that I [U2] ∈ X [U2]. We need to
prove that I belongs to X . We know X contains some J such that I [U2] = J [U2]. In other
words, for every ground atom p with pr(p) ⊆ U2 the following equivalence holds:
p ∈ I ⇐⇒ p ∈ J .
Since U1 is a subset of U2, every ground atom p with pr(p) ⊆ U1 also satisfies the above
equivalence. Thus, I [U1] = J [U1] and we conclude that I [U1] belongs to X [U1]. Since X is
saturated relative to U1, I must belong to X .
Lemma 38
Let U, V be disjoint sets of predicate symbols and M ∈ M be nonempty. Then
σ(M,U)[V ] = I [V ] .
Proof
Since σ(M,U) is a subset of I, left to right inclusion holds. Suppose I some interpretation
from I [V ], i.e. I contains only atoms with predicate symbols from V . Furthermore, take
some I ′ ∈ M and put I ′′ = I ∪ I ′[U ]. Since U is disjoint from V , I ′′[U ] = I ′[U ] and
I ′′[V ] = I . This implies that I ′′ belongs to σ(M,U), so I belongs to σ(M,U)[V ].
A.3 Semi-saturated MKNF Interpretations
There is also another class of MKNF interpretations for which a slightly modified version
of Proposition 27 holds. We introduce it here and then show another result using the newly
introduced notion.
Definition 39 (Semi-saturated MKNF Interpretation)
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M ∈ M. We say M is semi-saturated relative to
U if for every interpretation I ∈ I the following holds:
If I [U ] ∈M [U ] and I [P\U ] ∈M [P\U ], then I ∈M.
Proposition 40
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M,N be MKNF interpretations such that M is
saturated relative to U and N is saturated relative to P \ U . Then M ∩ N is an MKNF
interpretation that is semi-saturated relative to U , it coincides with M on U and with N on
P \ U .
Proof
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We will first prove the following claim: For evey I ∈ M and every J ∈ N there exists
some K ∈ M ∩N such that K [U ] = I [U ] and K [P\U ] = J [P\U ]. The reason this holds is
that the sets U and (P \ U) are disjoint. Let’s take some I ∈M and some J ∈ N and let
K = I [U ] ∪ J [P\U ] = { p ∈ I | pr(p) ⊆ U } ∪ { p ∈ J | pr(p) ⊆ P \ U } .
The following can now be derived:
K [U ] = { p ∈ K | pr(p) ⊆ U }
= { p ∈ I | pr(p) ⊆ U } ∪ { p ∈ J | pr(p) ⊆ U ∩ (P \ U) }
= { p ∈ I | pr(p) ⊆ U } = I [U ]
K [P\U ] = { p ∈ K | pr(p) ⊆ P \ U }
= { p ∈ I | pr(p) ⊆ U ∩ (P \ U) } ∪ { p ∈ J | pr(p) ⊆ P \ U }
= { p ∈ J | pr(p) ⊆ P \ U } = J [P\U ] .
Consequently, K must belong to M and also to N (because they are saturated relative to
U and P \ U , respectively), so K also belongs to M ∩N .
From the above it easily follows that M ∩N is nonempty and that both (M ∩N)[U ] =
M [U ] and (M ∩N)[P\U ] = N [P\U ] hold as well.
It remains to show that M ∩ N is semi-saturated relative to U . Let I ∈ I be such that
I [U ] belongs to (M ∩N)[U ] and I [P\U ] belongs to (M ∩N)[P\U ]. We need to prove that I
belongs toM ∩N . We know that (M ∩N)[U ] is a subset ofM [U ] and sinceM is saturated
relative to U , we conclude that I belongs to M . Similarly, (M ∩ N)[P\U ] is a subset of
N [P\U ] and sinceN is saturated relative to P\U , we conclude that I belongs toN . Hence,
I belongs to M ∩N .
Proposition 41
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M,N ∈ M be such that M is semi-saturated
relative to U . Then the following equivalences hold:
(1) M = N if and only if M ⊆ N and M [U ] ⊇ N [U ] and M [P\U ] ⊇ N [P\U ].
(2) M ( N if and only if M ⊆ N and either M [U ] ( N [U ] or M [P\U ] ( N [P\U ].
Proof
(1) The direct implication follows from Proposition 27(1). We will prove the converse
implication. Suppose M [U ] ⊇ N [U ], M [P\U ] ⊇ N [P\U ] and I ∈ N . We imme-
diately obtain I [U ] ∈ M [U ] and I [P\U ] ∈ M [P\U ] and since M is semi-saturated
relative to U , we can conclude that I ∈M .
(2) For the direct implication suppose that M ( N . Then there is some I ∈ N such
that I /∈M . Since M is semi-saturated relative to U , we obtain that I [U ] /∈M [U ] or
I [P\U ] /∈M [P\U ]. Consequently, either M [U ] is a proper subset of N [U ] or M [P\U ]
is a proper subset of N [P\U ]. The converse implication is a cosequence of Proposi-
tion 27(3).
Proposition 42
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M,N ∈ M be such that N is semi-saturated
relative to U . Then:
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(1) M ⊆ N if and only if M [U ] ⊆ N [U ] and M [P\U ] ⊆ N [P\U ].
(2) If M [U ] ⊆ N [U ] and M [P\U ] ⊆ N [P\U ] and at least one of the inclusions is proper,
then M ( N .
Proof
(1) The direct implication follows from Proposition 27(1). We will prove the converse
implication. Suppose M [U ] ⊆ N [U ], M [P\U ] ⊆ N [P\U ] and I ∈ M . We immedi-
ately obtain I [U ] ∈M [U ], hence also I [U ] ∈ N [U ]. Similarly, I [P\U ] ∈M [P\U ] and,
consequently, I [P\U ] ∈ N [P\U ]. Since N is semi-saturated relative to U , we can
conclude that I ∈ N . Consequently,M ⊆ N .
(2) This is a consequence of (1) and Proposition 27(3).
Corollary 43
LetU be a set of predicate symbols,M,N be MKNF interpretations semi-saturated relative
to U . Then the following equivalences hold:
(1) M ⊆ N if and only if M [U ] ⊆ N [U ] and M [P\U ] ⊆ N [P\U ].
(2) M = N if and only if M [U ] = N [U ] and M [P\U ] = N [P\U ].
(3) M ( N if and only if M [U ] ⊆ N [U ] and M [P\U ] ⊆ N [P\U ] and at least one of the
inclusions is proper.
Proof
(1) The direct implication follows directly from definitions of M [U ], N [U ], M [P\U ] and
N [P\U ]. For the converse implication let I ∈ M . Then I [U ] ∈ M [U ] ⊆ N [U ] and
I [P\U ] ∈M [P\U ] ⊆ N [P\U ]. Since N is semi-saturated, we conclude I ∈ N .
(2) This is a consequence of (1).
(3) This is a consequence of (1) and (2).
Proposition 44
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M1,M2 be MKNF interpretations. Then there
exists the greatest MKNF interpretation N that coincides with M1 on U and with M2 on
P \ U . Furthermore,N is semi-saturated relative to U and M1 ∩M2 ⊆ N .
Proof
Let N1 = σ(M1, U), N2 = σ(M2,P \ U) and N = N1 ∩N2. The claim now follows by
Propositions 34 and 40.
A.4 Sequence-saturated MKNF Interpretations
Definition 45 (Saturation Sequence, Difference Sequence)
A saturation sequence is a sequence 〈Sα〉α<µ of pairwise disjoint sets of predicate symbols
such that
⋃
α<µ Sα = P.
Definition 46 (Sequence Saturated MKNF Interpretation)
Let 〈Sα〉α<µ be a saturation sequence and M ∈ M. We say M is sequence-saturated
relative to S if for every interpretation I ∈ I the following holds:
If I [Sα] ∈M [Sα] for every ordinal α < µ, then I ∈M.
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Proposition 47
Let S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be a saturation sequence and M ∈ M. Then the following conditions
are equivalent:
1. M is sequence-saturated relative to S.
2. M =
⋂
α<µ σ(M,Sα).
3. M =
⋂
α<µXα and for any α < µ, Xα is saturated relative to Sα.
Proof
We first prove that 1. implies 2. Suppose M is sequence-saturated relative to S. It follows
from Proposition 34 that M is a subset of σ(M,Sα) for any α < µ. Thus, M is a subset
of
⋂
α<µ σ(M,Sα). To show that the converse inclusion holds as well, take some Her-
brand interpretation I from
⋂
α<µ σ(M,Sα). For any α < µ, Proposition 34 implies that
σ(M,Sα) coincides with M on Sα. Thus, since I belongs to σ(M,Sα), I [Sα] belongs to
M [Sα]. Since M is sequence-saturated relative to S, this implies that I belongs to M .
The implication from 2. to 3. is immediate by putting Xα = σ(M,Sα) and observing
that, by Proposition 34, Xα is saturated relative to Sα.
Finally, suppose that 3. holds and I is a Herbrand interpretation such that for any α < µ,
I [Sα] belongs to
M [Sα] =

⋂
β<µ
Xβ


[Sα]
⊆ X [Sα]α
Since Xα is saturated relative to Sα, we conclude that I belongs to Xα. The choice of
α < µ was arbitrary so we have proven that I belongs to M .
Proposition 48
Let S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be a saturation sequence, 〈Xα〉α<µ be a sequence of MKNF interpreta-
tions such that for all α < µ, Xα is saturated relative to Sα, and M =
⋂
α<µXα. Then M
is nonempty and for all α < µ, Xα = σ(M,Sα).
Proof
Pick some α < µ and some I ∈ Xα. We will prove that I belongs to σ(M,Sα). Let Iα = I
and for all β < µ such that β 6= α, let Iβ be any member of Xβ (note that Xβ is nonempty
because it is an MKNF interpretation). Now put
J =
⋃
β<µ
I
[Sβ ]
β .
To see that J belongs to M , take some β < µ and observe that J [Sβ ] = I [Sβ ]β ∈ X
[Sβ ]
β .
Since Xβ is saturated relative to Sβ , this implies that J belongs to Xβ . Hence, J belongs
to M . Moreover, I [Sα] = J [Sα], so I [Sα] belongs to M [Sα]. Thus, I belongs to σ(M,Sα).
For the converse inclusion, suppose that I belongs to σ(M,Sα) for some α < µ. Then
I [Sα] belongs to M [Sα]. Also,
M [Sα] =

⋂
β<µ
Xβ


[Sα]
⊆ X [Sα]α .
Thus, I [Sα] belongs to X [Sα]α and since Xα is saturated relative to Sα, I belongs to Xα.
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Finally, it follows from Xα = σ(M,Sα) and the fact that Xα is nonempty that M must
also be nonempty.
A.5 Properties of Subjective Formulae
Proposition 49 (Models of Subjective Formulae)
Let φ be a subjective MKNF formula, I1, I2 be Herbrand interpretations and M,N ∈ M.
Then
〈I1,M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ 〈I2,M,N〉 |= φ
Proof
Follows directly from Def. 2 and the fact that the valuation of a subjective formula in a
structure 〈I,M,N〉 is independent of I .
This property of subjective formulae gives rise to the following shortcut notation which
simplifies many of the following formalizations.
Definition 50 (Satisfiability for Subjective Formulae)
Let φ be a subjective formula, T be a set of subjective formulae and M,N ∈ M. We
introduce the following notation:
〈M,N〉 |= φ
def
⇐⇒ (∃I ∈ I)(〈I,M,N〉 |= φ)
〈M,N〉 |= T
def
⇐⇒ (∀φ ∈ T )(〈M,N〉 |= φ)
The following result relates the introduced shortcut notation to the notions of S5 and
MKNF models.
Proposition 51
Let T be a set of subjective formulae andM ∈M. ThenM |= T if and only if 〈M,M〉 |=
T . Furthermore,M is an MKNF model of T if and only if M is an S5 model of T and for
every MKNF interpretationM ′ )M it holds that 〈M ′,M〉 6|= T .
Proof
Straightforward by Definitions 2 and 50 and Proposition 49.
Proposition 52
Let φ be a subjective formula, U ⊆ P be a set of predicate symbols such that U ⊇ pr(φ)
and M,N ∈M. Then:
〈M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒
〈
M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ .
Proof
By Definition 50 we have
〈M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ (∃I ∈ I)(〈I,M,N〉 |= φ) .
By Proposition 25 we can equivalently rewrite the right hand side into
(∃I ∈ I)
(〈
I [U ],M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ
)
.
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Furthermore, since φ is subjective, we can use Proposition 49 to further rewrite the previous
formula into
(∃I ∈ I)
(〈
I,M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ
)
which is by Definition 50 equivalent to〈
M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ .
Corollary 53
Let φ be a subjective formula, U ⊆ P be a set of predicate symbols such that U ⊇ pr(φ)
and M,M ′, N,N ′ ∈ M be such that M coincides with M ′ on U and N coincides with
N ′ on U . Then
〈M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒ 〈M ′, N ′〉 |= φ .
Proof
By assumptions we know that M [U ] = M ′[U ] and N [U ] = N ′[U ]. Proposition 52 now
yields:
〈M,N〉 |= φ⇐⇒
〈
M [U ], N [U ]
〉
|= φ⇐⇒
〈
M ′[U ], N ′[U ]
〉
|= φ
⇐⇒ 〈M ′, N ′〉 |= φ .
Appendix B Proof of Splitting Set Theorem for Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases
Remark 54
Note that whenever U is a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K = 〈O,P〉, the
following can be easily shown to hold:
pr(bU (O)) ⊆ U ,
pr(bU (P)) ⊆ U ,
pr(pi(bU (K))) ⊆ U ,
pr(tU (O)) ⊆ P \ U .
Also note that the heads of rules in tU (P) contain only predicate symbols from P \ U
while their bodies may also contain predicate symbols from U . However, for anyX ∈M,
the above defined reducts eU (P , X) and eU (K, X) can be shown to mention only atoms
not belonging to U :
pr(pi(eU (K, X))) ⊆ P \ U .
Please stay warned that these rather basic observations will be used in the following text
(especially in the proofs) without further notice or reference.
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Definition 55 (Generalised Splitting Set Reduct)
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K = 〈O,P〉 and X,X ′ ∈ M. The
generalised splitting set reduct of K relative to U and 〈X ′, X〉 is a hybrid knowledge base
eU (K, X ′, X) = 〈tU (O), eU (P , X ′, X)〉where eU (P , X ′, X) consists of all rules r′ such
that there exists a rule r ∈ tU (P) satisfying the following conditions:
H(r′) = H(r) , (B1)
B(r′) = { L ∈ B(r) | pr(L) ⊆ P \ U } , (B2)
〈X ′, X〉 |= pi(B(r) \B(r′)) = pi({ L ∈ B(r) | pr(L) ⊆ U }) . (B3)
Remark 56
Note that for every hybrid knowledge base K and every X ∈ M the following holds:
eU (K, X) = eU (K, X,X). This will be heavily used in the following proofs.
Lemma 57
LetU be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge baseK andD,D′, E,E′, F, F ′, G,G′ ∈ M
be such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. E[U ] = D[U ] and E′[U ] = D′[U ];
2. F [P\U ] = D[P\U ] and F ′[P\U ] = D′[P\U ];
3. G[U ] = D[U ] and G′[U ] = D′[U ].
Then:
〈D′, D〉 |= pi(K) =⇒ 〈E′, E〉 |= pi(bU (K)) ∧ 〈F
′, F 〉 |= pi(eU (K, G
′, G)) .
Proof
Suppose that 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(K). Since pi(bU (K)) ⊆ pi(K), we immediately obtain 〈D′, D〉 |=
pi(bU (K)). Furthermore, from Corollary 53 we now obtain 〈E′, E〉 |= pi(bU (K)).
It remains to show that 〈F ′, F 〉 |= pi(eU (K, G′, G)). Let K = 〈O,P〉. We know that
pi(eU (K, G′, G)) consists of two sets: pi(tU (O)) and pi(eU (P , G′, G)). Since pi(tU (O)) ⊆
pi(K), we conclude that 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(tU (O)). Moreover, Corollary 53 now implies that
〈F ′, F 〉 |= pi(tU (O)). Now take some rule r′ ∈ eU (K, G′, G). If 〈F ′, F 〉 6|= pi(B(r′)),
then 〈F ′, F 〉 |= pi(r′). On the other hand, if 〈F ′, F 〉 |= pi(B(r′)), then Corollary 53
implies that 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(B(r′)). Moreover, by the definition of eU (K, G′, G), there
must be some rule r ∈ P such that H(r′) = H(r) and 〈G′, G〉 |= pi(B(r) \ B(r′)).
From the last property and Corollary 53 we obtain 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(B(r) \ B(r′)). So
〈D′, D〉 |= pi(B(r)) and since 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(K) and pi(K) contains pi(r), we conclude
that 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(H(r)). Consequently, since H(r′) = H(r), by Corollary 53 we obtain
〈F ′, F 〉 |= pi(H(r′)) and so 〈F ′, F 〉 |= pi(r′). The choice of r′ was arbitrary, so we have
also proven that 〈F ′, F 〉 |= pi(eU (P , G′, G)).
Lemma 58
LetU be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge baseK andD,D′, E,E′, F, F ′, G,G′ ∈ M
be such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. E[U ] = D[U ] and E′[U ] = D′[U ];
2. F [P\U ] = D[P\U ] and F ′[P\U ] = D′[P\U ];
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3. G[U ] = D[U ] and G′[U ] = D′[U ].
Then:
〈E′, E〉 |= pi(bU (K)) ∧ 〈F
′, F 〉 |= pi(eU (K, G
′, G)) =⇒ 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(K) .
Proof
Take some φ ∈ pi(K). We consider three cases depending on which part of K this formula
originates from:
a) If φ belongs to pi(bU (K)), then pr(φ) ⊆ U , so we can use Corollary 53 to infer
〈D′, D〉 |= φ from 〈E′, E〉 |= φ.
b) If φ belongs to pi(tU (O)), then φ also belongs to pi(eU (K, G′, G)) and pr(φ) ⊆
P \ U , so by Corollary 53 we can infer 〈D′, D〉 |= φ from 〈F ′, F 〉 |= φ.
c) If φ belongs to pi(tU (P)), then φ = pi(r) for some rule r. If 〈D′, D〉 6|= pi(B(r)),
then 〈M ′,M〉 |= pi(r) and we are finished. On the other hand, if 〈D′, D〉 |=
pi(B(r)), then let B = {L ∈ B(r) | pr(L) ⊆ U }. We have 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(B) and
by Corollary 53 we can conclude that 〈G′, G〉 |= pi(B). Consequently, eU (P , G′, G)
contains a rule r′ such that H(r′) = H(r) and B(r′) = B(r) \ B. We know
that 〈F ′, F 〉 |= pi(r′) and since pr(r′) ⊆ P \ U , we can use Corollary 53 to in-
fer 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(r′). Furthermore, 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(B(r′)), so 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(H(r′)).
Consequently, 〈D′, D〉 |= pi(r), which is the desired result.
Proposition 59
LetU be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge baseK andD,D′, E,E′, F, F ′, G,G′ ∈ M
be such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. E[U ] = D[U ] and E′[U ] = D′[U ];
2. F [P\U ] = D[P\U ] and F ′[P\U ] = D′[P\U ];
3. G[U ] = D[U ] and G′[U ] = D′[U ].
Then:
〈D′, D〉 |= pi(K) ⇐⇒ 〈E′, E〉 |= pi(bU (K)) ∧ 〈F
′, F 〉 |= pi(eU (K, G
′, G)) .
Proof
Follows by Lemmas 57 and 58.
Corollary 60
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K and M,X ∈ M be such that
X [U ] = M [U ]. Then:
M |= pi(K) ⇐⇒M |= pi(bU (K)) ∧M |= pi(eU (K, X)) .
Proof
Proposition 59 for D = D′ = E = E′ = F = F ′ = M and G = G′ = X implies that
〈M,M〉 |= pi(K) ⇐⇒ 〈M,M〉 |= pi(bU (K)) ∧ 〈M,M〉 |= pi(eU (K, X,X)) .
The claim of this corollary now follows from Proposition 51.
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Corollary 61
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K and M,X, Y be MKNF interpreta-
tions such that X [U ] =M [U ] and Y [P\U ] = M [P\U ]. Then:
M |= pi(K) ⇐⇒ X |= pi(bU (K)) ∧ Y |= pi(eU (K, X)) .
Proof
Proposition 59 for D = D′ = M , E = E′ = X , F = F ′ = Y and G = G′ = X implies
that
〈M,M〉 |= pi(K) ⇐⇒ 〈X,X〉 |= pi(bU (K)) ∧ 〈Y, Y 〉 |= pi(eU (K, X,X)) .
The claim of this corollary now follows from Proposition 51.
Corollary 62
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K and M,M ′, X,X ′ be MKNF
interpretations such that M |= pi(K), M ′[P\U ] = M [P\U ], X [U ] = M [U ] and X ′[U ] =
M ′[U ]. Then:
〈M ′,M〉 6|= pi(K) =⇒ 〈X ′, X〉 6|= pi(bU (K)) .
Proof
Proposition 59 for D = M , D′ = M ′, E = X , E′ = X ′, F = F ′ = M , G = G′ = X
implies that
〈M ′,M〉 6|= pi(K) ⇐⇒ 〈X ′, X〉 6|= pi(bU (K)) ∨ 〈M,M〉 6|= pi(eU (K, X,X)) .
Furthermore, from Corollary 60 we know that M |= pi(eU (K, X)) is always satisfied
becauseM |= pi(K). Hence, by Corollary 53, the second disjunct on the right hand side of
the above equivalence can be safely omitted and we obtain the claim of this corollary.
Corollary 63
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K and M,M ′, X, Y, Y ′ be MKNF
interpretations such that M |= pi(K), M ′[U ] = X [U ] = M [U ], Y [P\U ] = M [P\U ] and
Y ′[P\U ] =M ′[P\U ]. Then:
〈M ′,M〉 6|= pi(K) =⇒ 〈Y ′, Y 〉 6|= pi(eU (K, X)) .
Proof
Proposition 59 for D = M , D′ = M ′, E = E′ = M , F = Y , F ′ = Y ′, G = G′ = X
implies that
〈M ′,M〉 6|= pi(K) ⇐⇒ 〈M,M〉 6|= pi(bU (K)) ∨ 〈Y
′, Y 〉 6|= pi(eU (K, X,X)) .
Furthermore, from Corollary 60 we know that M |= pi(bU (K)) is always satisfied because
M |= pi(K). Hence, by Corollary 53, the first disjunct in the right hand side of the above
equivalence can be safely omitted and we obtain the claim of this corollary.
Corollary 64
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K and M,M ′, X,X ′ be MKNF
interpretations such that X [U ] =M [U ] and X ′[U ] = M ′[U ]. Then:
〈X ′, X〉 6|= pi(bU (K)) =⇒ 〈M
′,M〉 6|= pi(K) .
Proof
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Proposition 59 for D = M , D′ = M ′, E = X , E′ = X ′, F = G = M , F ′ = G′ = M ′
implies that
〈M ′,M〉 6|= pi(K) ⇐⇒ 〈X ′, X〉 6|= pi(bU (K)) ∨ 〈M
′,M〉 6|= pi(eU (K,M
′,M)) .
The claim of this corollary follows directly from this equivalence.
Corollary 65
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K and M,M ′, X, Y, Y ′ be MKNF
interpretations such that M ′[U ] = X [U ] = M [U ], Y [P\U ] = M [P\U ] and Y ′[P\U ] =
M ′[P\U ]. Then:
〈Y ′, Y 〉 6|= pi(eU (K, X)) =⇒ 〈M
′,M〉 6|= pi(K) .
Proof
Proposition 59 for D = M , D′ = M ′, E = E′ = M , F = Y , F ′ = Y ′, G = G′ = X
implies that
〈M ′,M〉 6|= pi(K) ⇐⇒ 〈M,M〉 6|= pi(bU (K)) ∨ 〈Y
′, Y 〉 6|= pi(eU (K, X,X)) .
The claim of this corollary follows directly from this equivalence.
Proposition 66
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K, M be an MKNF model of K and
X = σ(M,U). Then X is an MKNF model of bU (K).
Proof
By Proposition 34 we know that M ⊆ X and that X is saturated relative to U . We need
to show that X is an MKNF model of bU (K). By Proposition 51, this holds if and only if
X is an S5 model of pi(bU (K)) and for every X ′ ) X it holds that 〈X ′, X〉 6|= pi(bU (K)).
The former follows directly from Corollary 61, so we will focus on the latter condition.
Let’s pick some X ′ ) X . By Proposition 44 there exists the greatest MKNF interpre-
tation M ′ that coincides with X ′ on U (i.e. M ′[U ] = X ′[U ]) and with M on P \ U (i.e.
M ′[P\U ] =M [P\U ]) and which contains X ′ ∩M . Hence,
M ⊆ X ∩M ⊆ X ′ ∩M ⊆M ′ . (B4)
Furthermore, we know that X is saturated relative to U , so we can use Proposition 30(2)
to conclude that
M [U ] = X [U ] ( X ′[U ] =M ′[U ] . (B5)
Consequently, by (B4), (B5) and Proposition 27(3), we obtain M ( M ′. This, together
with the assumption that M is an MKNF model of K, implies that 〈M ′,M〉 6|= pi(K).
We can now apply Corollary 62 to conclude that 〈X ′, X〉 6|= pi(bU (K)), which is also the
desired conclusion.
Proposition 67
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K, M be an MKNF model of K, X
be the greatest MKNF interpretation that coincides with M on U and Y be the greatest
MKNF interpretation that coincides with M on P \ U . Then Y is an MKNF model of
eU (K, X).
Proof
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By Proposition 34 we know that M ⊆ Y and that Y is saturated relative to P \ U . We
need to show that Y is an MKNF model of eU (K, X). By Proposition 51, this holds if and
only if Y is and S5 model of pi(eU (K, X)) and for every Y ′ ) Y it holds that 〈Y ′, Y 〉 6|=
pi(eU (K, X)). The former follows directly from Corollary 61, so we will focus on the latter
condition.
Let’s pick some Y ′ ) Y . By Proposition 44 there exists the greatest MKNF interpre-
tation M ′ that coincides with M on U (i.e. M ′[U ] = M [U ]) and with Y ′ on P \ U (i.e.
M ′[P\U ] = Y ′[P\U ]) and which contains M ∩ Y ′. Hence,
M ⊆M ∩ Y ⊆M ∩ Y ′ ⊆M ′ . (B6)
Furthermore, we know that Y is saturated relative to P \ U , so we can use Proposition
30(2) to conclude that
M [P\U ] = Y ′[P\U ] ( Y ′[P\U ] =M ′[P\U ] . (B7)
Consequently, by (B6), (B7) and Proposition 27(3), we obtain M ( M ′. This, together
with the assumption that M is an MKNF model of K, implies that 〈M ′,M〉 6|= pi(K). We
can now apply Corollary 63 to conclude that 〈Y ′, Y 〉 6|= pi(eU (K, X)), which is also the
desired conclusion.
Proposition 68
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K and 〈X,Y 〉 be a solution to K with
respect to U . Then X ∩ Y is an MKNF model of K.
Proof
Let K = 〈O,P〉 and M = X ∩ Y . In order to show that M is an MKNF model of K, we
need to prove that M |= pi(K) and that for everyM ′ )M it holds that 〈M ′,M〉 6|= pi(K).
We will verify the two conditions separately.
Since 〈X,Y 〉 is a solution to K with respect to U , X must an MKNF model of bU (K)
and Y an MKNF model of eU (K, X). So X |= pi(bU (K)) and Y |= pi(eU (K, X)). Conse-
quently, by Corollary 61, M |= pi(K).
We know that X is an MKNF model of bU (K), so, by Proposition 29, X is saturated
relative to U . Similarly, since Y is an MKNF model of eU (K, X), it must be saturated
relative to P \ U . Hence, by Proposition 40, M is semi-saturated relative to U , M [U ] =
X [U ] and M [P\U ] = Y [P\U ].
Now take some MKNF interpretation M ′ ) M and let X ′ = X ∪ M ′ and Y ′ =
Y ∪M ′. We already inferred that M is semi-saturated relative to U , which means that by
Proposition 41(2) one of the following cases must occur:
a) If M ′[U ] )M [U ], then
X ′[U ] = X [U ] ∪M ′[U ] = M ′[U ] )M [U ] = X [U ] ,
and so Proposition 27(3) implies that X ′ ) X . Hence, since X is an MKNF model
of bU (K), we infer that 〈X ′, X〉 6|= pi(bU (K)) and by Corollary 64 we obtain
〈M ′,M〉 6|= pi(K), which is what we wanted to prove.
b) If M ′[U ] = M [U ] and M ′[P\U ] )M [P\U ], then X ′[U ] =M ′[U ] = M [U ] and
Y ′[P\U ] = Y [P\U ] ∪M ′[P\U ] = M ′[P\U ] )M [P\U ] = Y [P\U ] ,
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and so Proposition 27(3) implies that Y ′ ) Y . Hence, since Y is an MKNF model
of eU (K, X), we infer that 〈Y ′, Y 〉 6|= pi(eU (K, X)) and by Corollary 65 we obtain
〈M ′,M〉 6|= pi(K), which is what we wanted to prove.
Theorem 7 (Splitting Theorem for Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases)
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K. An MKNF interpretation M is an
MKNF model of K if and only if M = X ∩ Y for some solution 〈X,Y 〉 to K with respect
to U .
Proof of Theorem 7
First suppose that M is an MKNF model of K. By Proposition 66 we know that X =
σ(M,U) is an MKNF model of bU (K) and by Proposition 67 that the Y = σ(M,P \ U)
is an MKNF model of eU (K, X). Furthermore, by Proposition 34, X [U ] = M [U ] and X
is saturated relative to U , Y [P\U ] = M [P\U ] and Y is saturated relative to P \ U , and
M ⊆ X ∩ Y . Finally, by Proposition 40 we obtain the following:
(X ∩ Y )[U ] = X [U ] = M [U ] ,
(X ∩ Y )[P\U ] = Y [P\U ] =M [P\U ] .
It remains to show that M ⊇ X ∩ Y . Suppose this is not the case, so M ( X ∩ Y .
Then, since M is an MKNF model of K, 〈X ∩ Y,M〉 6|= pi(K) and by Proposition 59 for
D =M , D′ = X ∩ Y , E = E′ = F = F ′ = M , G = G′ = X , we obtain
〈M,M〉 6|= pi(bU (K)) ∨ 〈M,M〉 6|= pi(eU (K, X,X)) .
However, Corollary 60 now entails M 6|= pi(K), a conflict with the assumption that M is
an MKNF model of K. Consequently,M = X ∩ Y .
The converse implication follows directly from Proposition 68.
Corollary 69
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K and M ∈ M. If M is an MKNF
model of K, then the pair
〈σ(M,U), σ(M,P \ U)〉
is a solution toK with respect to U ,M = σ(M,U)∩σ(M,P\U) andM is semi-saturated
relative to U .
Proof
This is a consequence of the proof of Theorem 7 and of Proposition 40.
Corollary 70
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K such that there exists at least one
solution to K relative to U . Then K is MKNF satisfiable and an MKNF interpretation M
is an MKNF model of K if and only if M = X ∩ Y for some solution 〈X,Y 〉 to K with
respect to U .
Proof
Follows from Theorem 7.
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Corollary 71
Let U be a splitting set for a hybrid knowledge base K. An MKNF formula φ is MKNF
entailed byK if and only if, for every solution 〈X,Y 〉 ofK with respect to U ,X ∩Y |= φ.
Proof
Follows from Theorem 7.
Appendix C Proof of Splitting Sequence Theorem for Hybrid MKNF Knowledge
Bases
Many parts of the proofs in this section are adapted from (Turner 1996).
Remark 72
It is easy to see that solutions to K with respect to a splitting sequence 〈U,P〉 are the same
as the solutions to K with respect to the splitting set U .
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge base K, and let
〈Xα〉α<µ be a sequence of MKNF interpretations. Then:
pr(bU0(K)) ⊆ U0
pr
(
eUα
(
bUα+1(K),
⋂
η≤αXη
))
⊆ Uα+1 \ Uα whenever α+ 1 < µ
Furthermore, when X is a solution to K with respect to U , then X0 is saturated relative
to U0 and for every α such that α + 1 < µ, Xα+1 is saturated relative to Uα+1 \ Uα.
Also note that for any limit ordinal α, Xα = M, so Xα is saturated relative to any set of
predicate symbols.
Lemma 73
Let 〈Uα〉α<µ be a sequence of sets of atoms and 〈Xα〉α<µ be a sequence of members of
M such that for all α < µ, Xα is saturated relative to Uα. Then
⋂
α<µXα is saturated
relative to
⋃
α<µ Uα.
Proof
Let U =
⋃
α<µ Uα and X =
⋂
α<µXα and suppose I [U ] belongs to X [U ]. Then there
is some J ∈ X such that I [U ] = J [U ]. This means that for every ground atom p with
pr(p) ⊆ U ,
p ∈ I ⇐⇒ p ∈ J .
We need to show that I belongs to X . Take some β < µ and any atom p such that pr(p) ⊆
Uβ . Since Uβ is a subset of U , we immediately obtain
p ∈ I ⇐⇒ p ∈ J .
Furthermore, since J ∈ X ⊆ Xβ , it follows that I [Uβ ] belongs to X
[Uβ ]
β . Moreover,Xβ is
saturated relative to Uβ , so we conclude that I belongs to Xβ . Since the choice of β was
arbitrary, I belongs to Xβ for all β < µ. Thus, I belongs to X as well.
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Lemma 74
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge base K and X =
〈Xα〉α<µ be a sequence of members of M such that X0 is saturated relative to U0, for
each α such that α + 1 < µ, Xα+1 is saturated relative to Uα+1 \ Uα, and for every limit
ordinal α < µ, Xα = I. Then for all ordinals ordinal β < α < µ the following holds:
•
⋂
η≤β Xη is saturated relative to Uβ ;
•
⋂
β<η≤αXη is saturated relative to Uα \ Uβ;
•
⋂
α<η<µXη is saturated relative to P \ Uα.
Proof
Let 〈Vα〉α<µ be a sequence of sets of atoms defined as follows: V0 = U0, for every α
such that α + 1 < µ, Vα+1 = Uα+1 \ Uα, and for every limit ordinal α, Vα = ∅. By the
definition of X , it must hold for every ordinal α < µ that Xα is saturated relative to Vα.
Furthermore, by Lemma 73 we obtain that for every α < µ,
⋂
η≤αXη is saturated relative
to ⋃
η≤α
Vη = U0 ∪
⋃
η<α
Uη+1 \ Uη = Uα .
The same lemma implies that
⋂
β<η≤αXη must be saturated relative to⋃
β<η≤α
Vη =
⋃
β≤η<η+1≤α
Uη+1 \ Uη = Uα \ Uβ
and that
⋂
α<η<µXη must be saturated relative to⋃
α<η<µ
Vη =
⋃
α≤η<η+1<µ
Uη+1 \ Uη = P \ Uα .
Lemma 75
LetU = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge baseK,M be an MKNF
interpretation and X = 〈Xα〉α<µ be a sequence of MKNF interpretations such that
• X0 = σ(M,U0);
• for all α such that α+ 1 < µ, Xα+1 = σ(M,Uα+1 \ Uα);
• for any limit ordinal α < µ, Xα = I.
If M is an MKNF model of K, then for every ordinal α < µ,⋂
η≤α
Xη = σ(M,Uα) .
Proof
We will prove by induction on α:
1◦ Suppose α = 0. We need to show that X0 = σ(M,U0), which follows directly from
the definition of X0.
2◦ Suppose α such that α + 1 < µ and by the inductive assumption,
⋂
η≤αXη =
σ(M,Uα). We immediately obtain:⋂
η≤α+1
Xη = Xα+1 ∩
⋂
η≤α
Xη = Xα+1 ∩ σ(M,Uα)
= σ(M,Uα+1 \ Uα) ∩ σ(M,Uα) .
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It remains to show that
σ(M,Uα+1) = σ(M,Uα+1 \ Uα) ∩ σ(M,Uα) .
We know that Uα+1 is a splitting set for K and that M is an MKNF model of K, so
by Corollary 69 it follows that N = σ(M,Uα+1) is an MKNF model of bUα+1(K).
Furthermore, it can be easily verified that Uα is a splitting set for bUα+1(K), so by
another application of Corollary 69 we obtain that
σ(M,Uα+1) = N = σ(N,Uα) ∩ σ(N,P \ Uα) . (C1)
Moreover, Proposition 35 yields
σ(N,Uα) = σ(σ(M,Uα+1), Uα) = σ(M,Uα+1 ∩ Uα)
= σ(M,Uα)
(C2)
and
σ(N,P \ Uα) = σ(σ(M,Uα+1),P \ Uα) = σ(M,Uα+1 ∩ (P \ Uα))
= σ(M,Uα+1 \ Uα) .
(C3)
The desired conclusion follows from (C1), (C2) and (C3).
3◦ Suppose α < µ is a limit ordinal and for all η < α it holds that
⋂
β≤ηXβ =
σ(M,Uη). First note that⋂
η≤α
Xη = Xα ∩
⋂
η<α
Xη = I ∩
⋂
η<α
⋂
β≤η
Xβ =
⋂
η<α
σ(M,Uη)
=
⋂
η<α
{
I ∈ I
∣∣∣ (∃J ∈M)(J [Uη ] = I [Uη ]) }
=
{
I ∈ I
∣∣∣ (∀η < α)(∃J ∈M)(J [Uη ] = I [Uη]) }
and also that
σ(M,Uα) = σ
(
M,
⋃
η<α
Uη
)
=
{
I ∈ I
∣∣∣ (∃J ∈M)(J [⋃η<α Uη] = I[⋃η<α Uη]) } .
From these two identities it can be inferred that σ(M,Uα) is a subset of
⋂
η≤αXη .
Indeed, if I belongs to σ(M,Uα), then for some J ∈ M we have J [
⋃
η<α Uη] =
I[
⋃
η<α Uη], hence for any η0 < α and any atom p such that pr(p) ⊆ Uη0 ⊆
⋃
η<α Uη
we obtain
p ∈ J ⇐⇒ p ∈ I
To prove that the converse inclusion holds as well, we let Y =
⋂
η≤αXη and proceed
by contradiction, assuming that σ(M,Uα) is a proper subset of Y . By Corollary 69
we know that σ(M,Uα) is an MKNF model of bUα(K), so there must be some
formula φ ∈ bUα(K) such that
〈Y, σ(M,Uα)〉 6|= φ .
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Furthermore, since Uα =
⋃
η<α Uη and pr(φ) is a finite set of predicate symbols,
there must be some β < α such that pr(φ) is a subset of Uβ . Consequently, by
Corollary 53, we obtain 〈
Y [Uβ ], σ(M,Uα)
[Uβ ]
〉
6|= φ .
Let Y1 =
⋂
η≤β Xη and Y2 =
⋂
β<η≤αXη. By Lemma 74, Y1 is saturated relative
to Uβ and Y2 is saturated relative to Uα \ Uβ and thus by Lemma 37 also relative to
P \ Uβ . Furthermore, Y = Y1 ∩ Y2, so by Proposition 40, Y [Uβ ] = Y [Uβ ]1 . Hence,〈
Y
[Uβ ]
1 , σ(M,Uα)
[Uβ ]
〉
6|= φ
and the inductive assumption for β yields〈
σ(M,Uβ)
[Uβ ], σ(M,Uα)
[Uβ ]
〉
6|= φ .
Finally, since Uβ is a subset of Uα, Proposition 36 implies that
σ(M,Uα)
[Uβ ] = M [Uβ ] = σ(M,Uβ)
[Uβ ] ,
so 〈
σ(M,Uβ)
[Uβ ], σ(M,Uβ)
[Uβ ]
〉
6|= φ .
Corollary 53 now yields 〈σ(M,Uβ), σ(M,Uβ)〉 6|= φ. But at the same time, Uβ is
a splitting set for K, so, by Corollary 69, σ(M,Uβ) is an MKNF model of bUβ (K).
However, φ belongs to bUβ (K), so we reached the desired contradiction.
Proposition 76
LetU = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge baseK,M be an MKNF
interpretation and X = 〈Xα〉α<µ be a sequence of MKNF interpretations such that
• X0 = σ(M,U0);
• for all α such that α+ 1 < µ, Xα+1 = σ(M,Uα+1 \ Uα);
• for any limit ordinal α < µ, Xα = I.
If M is an MKNF model of K, then X is a solution to K with respect to U .
Proof
There are four conditions to verify.
First,X0 must be an MKNF model of bU0(K). SinceU0 is a splitting set forK, Corollary
69 yields that σ(M,U0) is an MKNF model of bU0(K). By definition, X0 = σ(M,U0),
thus this part of the proof is finished.
Second, for any ordinal α such that α + 1 < µ it should hold that Xα+1 is an MKNF
model of
eUα
(
bUα+1(K),
⋂
η≤αXη
)
.
By Corollary 69, N = σ(M,Uα+1) is an MKNF model of bUα+1(K). Furthermore, it can
be easily seen thatUα is a splitting set for bUα+1 , so by another application of Corollary 69,
we obtain that σ(N,P \Uα) is an MKNF model of eUα(bUα+1(K), σ(N,Uα)). Moreover,
by Proposition 35,
σ(N,Uα) = σ(σ(M,Uα+1), Uα) = σ(M,Uα+1 ∩ Uα) = σ(M,Uα)
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and also
σ(N,P \ Uα) = σ(σ(M,Uα+1),P \ Uα) = σ(M,Uα+1 ∩ (P \ Uα))
= σ(M,Uα+1 \ Uα) .
Since we know from Lemma 75 that σ(M,Uα) =
⋂
η≤αXη and by definition σ(M,Uα+1\
Uα) = Xα+1, we have shown that Xα+1 is an MKNF model of
eUα
(
bUα+1(K),
⋂
η≤αXη
)
.
Third, for every limit ordinal α < µ, Xα = I holds by definition.
Fourth, by definition of X , M is a subset of Xα for every α < µ. Hence,
∅ 6= M ⊆
⋂
α<µ
Xα ,
which finishes our proof.
Proposition 77
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge base K. If X =
〈Xα〉α<µ is a solution to K with respect to U , then for all α < µ,
⋂
η≤αXη is an MKNF
model of bUα(K).
Proof
Let Yα =
⋂
η≤αXη for every α < µ. We will proceed by induction on α:
1◦ For α = 0 we need to show that Y0 = X0 is an MKNF model of bU0(K). This
follows directly from the assumptions.
2◦ For α such that α + 1 < µ we need to show that Yα+1 is an MKNF model of
bUα+1(K). By the inductive assumption, Yα is an MKNF model of bUα(K). Further-
more,
bUα(bUα+1(K)) = bUα(K)
and since X is a solution to K with respect to U , Xα+1 must an MKNF model of
eUα
(
bUα+1(K), Yα
)
.
Moreover, sinceUα is a splitting set forK, it must also be a splitting set for bUα+1(K).
Consequently, by Theorem 7, Yα ∩ Xα+1 = Yα+1 must be an MKNF model of
bUα+1(K).
3◦ For a limit ordinal α < µ we need to show that Yα is an MKNF model of bUα(K).
First we will show that Yα |= bUα(K) and then that for every Y ′ ) Yα it holds that
〈Y ′, Yα〉 6|= bUα(K).
Take some φ ∈ bUα(K) and suppose β < α is some ordinal such that pr(φ) is a sub-
set of Uβ . We know that Yβ is an MKNF model of bUβ (K), so Yβ |= φ. Furthermore,
for every η such that η < α, Xη+1 is an MKNF model of eUη(bUη+1(K), Yη), so by
Proposition 29, Xη+1 is saturated relative to Uη+1 \ Uη. Consequently, by Lemma
74, Yβ =
⋂
η≤βXη is saturated relative to Uβ and
⋂
β<η≤αXη is saturated relative
to Uα \ Uβ and thus by Lemma 37 it is also saturated relative to P \ Uβ . Hence,
by Proposition 40, for Yα = Yβ ∩
⋂
β<η≤αXη it holds that Y
[Uβ ]
α = Y
[Uβ ]
β , and so
Yα |= φ follows from Corollary 26.
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Now suppose Y ′ ) Yα. Then there must be some I ∈ Y ′ \ Yα. Take some β < α
such that I /∈ Yβ (there must be such β, otherwise I ∈ Yα). Let Y ′′ = Y ′ ∪ Yβ . By
the inductive assumption, Yβ is an MKNF model of bUβ (K), so there must be some
φ ∈ bUβ (K) such that
〈Y ′′, Yβ〉 6|= φ
Furthermore, Y [Uβ ]β = Y
[Uβ ]
α and
Y ′′[Uβ ] = Y ′[Uβ ] ∪ Y
[Uβ ]
β = Y
′[Uβ ] ∪ Y
[Uβ ]
α = (Y
′ ∪ Yα)
[Uβ ] = Y ′[Uβ ] .
Consequently, by Corollary 53, 〈Y ′, Yα〉 6|= φ.
Lemma 78
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge base K and let V =
〈Vα〉α<µ+1 be a sequence of sets of atoms such that for every α < µ, Vα = Uα and
Vµ = P. Then V is a splitting sequence for K.
Moreover, if X = 〈Xα〉α<µ is a solution to K with respect to U , then Y = 〈Yα〉α<µ+1,
where for all α < µ, Yα = Xα, and Yµ = I, is a solution to K with respect to V .
Proof
It is easy to see that V is monotone, continuous, that every Vα is a splitting set for K and
that
⋃
α<µ+1 Vα = P.
Now suppose that X is a solution to K with respect to U . All the properties of X prop-
agate to Y , so one only needs to check that µ is handled correctly. In case µ is a limit
ordinal, we need to show that Yµ = I, which it does. On the other hand, if µ is a nonlimit
ordinal, then let γ be such that γ + 1 = µ. From
⋃
α<µ Uα = P it follows that Uγ = P,
so the set
eUγ
(
bUµ(K),
⋂
η≤γ Yη
)
is empty. Consequently, Yµ = I is its MKNF model.
Theorem 10 (Splitting Sequence Theorem for Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Bases)
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge base K. Then M is an
MKNF model of K if and only if M = ⋂α<µXα for some solution 〈Xα〉α<µ to K with
respect to U .
Proof of Theorem 10
If M is an MKNF model of K, then it follows by Proposition 76 that there is a solution X
to K with respect to U . Furthermore, by Lemma 78, there is also a solution Y to K with
respect to V = 〈Vα〉α<µ+1 such that for all α < µ, Vα = Uα and Vµ = P. Consequently,
by Lemma 75,⋂
α<µ
Xα =
⋂
α<µ
Yα = I ∩
⋂
α<µ
Yα =
⋂
α<µ+1
Yα = σ(M,Vµ) = σ(M,P) =M .
To prove the converse implication, supposeX is a solution toK with respect to U . Then,
by Lemma 78, there is also a solution Y to K with respect to V = 〈Vα〉α<µ+1 such that
for all α < µ, Vα = Uα and Vµ = P. Furthermore,⋂
η<µ
Xη =
⋂
η≤µ
Yη
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and by Proposition 77,
⋂
η≤µ Yη is an MKNF model of bVµ(K) = bP(K) = K.
Corollary 79
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge base K and M ∈ M.
If M is an MKNF model of K, then the sequence X = 〈Xα〉α<µ is a solution to K with
respect to U where
• X0 = σ(M,U0);
• for all α such that α+ 1 < µ, Xα+1 = σ(M,Uα+1 \ Uα);
• for any limit ordinal α < µ, Xα = I.
Furthermore,M =
⋂
α<µXα.
Proof
Follows from the proof of Theorem 10 and from Proposition 76.
Corollary 80
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge base K, such that there
exists at least one solution to K with respect to U . Then K is MKNF satisfiable, and M
is an MKNF model of K if and only if M =
⋂
α<µXα for some solution 〈Xα〉α<µ to K
with respect to U
Proof
Follows by Theorem 10.
Corollary 81
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a hybrid knowledge base K. A formula φ is
an MKNF consequence of K if and only if, for every solution 〈Xα〉α<µ to K with respect
to U ,
⋂
α<µXα |= φ.
Proof
Follows by Theorem 10.
Appendix D Splitting Theorem for Minimal Change Update Operator
D.1 Basic Properties of Minimal Change Update Operator
Lemma 82
Let M,N ∈M. If M is a subset of N , then M ⊕N =M . Also, if M is a superset of N ,
then M ⊕N = N .
Proof
SupposeM is a subset ofN . It can be verified easily that for every Herbrand interpretation
I , I <I J for every J 6= I . Thus, for all I ∈ M , I ⊕ N = { I } and, consequently,
M ⊕N = M .
Now suppose that M is a superset of N . Then for every I ∈ N we have I ⊕N = { I },
so M ⊕N is a superset of N . At the same time, M ⊕N is a subset of N by construction.
Thus, M ⊕N = N .
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Corollary 83
Let M ∈M. Then M ⊕M = M .
Proof
Follows from Lemma 82.
Lemma 84
Let M,N ∈M. If M is empty or N is empty, then M ⊕N is empty.
Proof
Follows from Lemma 82.
D.2 Splitting and Updating a Sequence of First-Order Theories
We will be using the following, inductive definition of a minimal change update model of
a sequence of first-order theories. It is equivalent to the definition from Sect. 2, just more
precise.
Definition 85 (Minimal Change Update Model)
Let U = 〈Ui〉i<n be a finite sequence of first-order theories. We define:
mod(U) =
⊕
〈mod(Ui)〉i<n , where⊕
〈 〉 = I and⊕
〈Mi〉i<k+1 =
(⊕
〈Mi〉i<k
)
⊕Mk for any k ≥ 0.
If mod(U) is nonempty, we say it is the minimal change update model of U .
Remark 86
Note that the above definition is compatible with the definition of a minimal change update
of T ⊕U in the following sense:M is a minimal change update model of T ⊕U if and only
if M is a minimal change update model of 〈T ,U〉. This follows from the above definition
and from the fact that I ⊕X = X for any X ∈ M (by Lemma 82).
Lemma 87
Let T be a first-order theory. Then either T has no MKNF model and mod(T ) = ∅, or T
has a unique MKNF model that coincides with mod(T ). Moreover,
mod(T ) =
⋂
φ∈T
mod(φ)
Additionally, the S5 and MKNF models of T coincide with S5 and MKNF models of
{Kφ | φ ∈ T }.
Proof
Follows from the definition of an S5 and MKNF models.
Proposition 88
Let T be a first-order theory. Then M is the MKNF model of T if and only if M is the
minimal change update model of 〈T 〉.
Proof
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Follows by Lemma 87 and the fact that I ⊕M =M for any M ∈ M.
Proposition 89
Let U = 〈Ui〉i<n be a sequence of first-order theories with n > 0 and M be the minimal
change update model of U . Then M |= Un−1.
Proof (sketch)
This follows by induction on n, by the fact thatM⊕N is a subset ofN for anyM,N ∈M.
Proposition 90
Let U = 〈Ui〉i<n+1 be a nonempty sequence of first-order theories and M be an MKNF
interpretation. ThenM is a minimal change update model of U if and only ifM = N1⊕N2
where N1 is the minimal change update model of 〈Ui〉i<n and N2 is the MKNF model of
Un.
Proof
By Def. 85, M is the minimal change update model of U if and only if
M = mod(U) = N1 ⊕N2 ,
where N1 =
⊕
〈mod(Ui)〉i<n and N2 = mod(Un). Furthermore, since M is nonempty,
it follows by Lemma 84 that both N1 and N2 are nonempty. So N1 is the minimal change
update model of 〈Ui〉i<n by Def. 85 andN2 is the MKNF model of Un by Lemma 87.
Proposition 91
Let S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be a saturation sequence, N ∈ M be sequence-saturated relative to S
and J be a Herbrand interpretation. Then
J ∈ I ⊕N ⇐⇒ (∀α < µ)(J [Sα] ∈ I [Sα] ⊕N [Sα]) .
Proof
Suppose J does not belong to I⊕N . If J does not belong to N , then since N is sequence-
saturated relative to S, there is some α < µ such that J [Sα] does not belong to N [Sα]. But
then J [Sα] also does not belong to I [Sα] ⊕N [Sα], so we reached the desired conclusion.
In the principal case, when J belongs to N , we know there exists some J ′ ∈ N such
that J ′ <I J . This means that for every predicate symbol P ∈ P,
diff (P, I, J ′) ⊆ diff (P, I, J) (D1)
and for some predicate symbol P0 ∈ P,
diff (P0, I, J
′) ( diff (P0, I, J) . (D2)
Since S is a saturation sequence, there is a unique ordinal α such that P0 belongs to Sα. It
follows from (D2) that
diff (P0, I
[Sα], J ′[Sα]) = diff (P0, I, J
′) ( diff (P0, I, J) = diff (P0, I
[Sα], J [Sα])
Furthermore, for any predicate symbol P ∈ Sα it follows from (D1) that
diff (P, I [Sα], J ′[Sα]) = diff (P, I, J ′) ⊆ diff (P, I, J) = diff (P, I [Sα], J [Sα]) .
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Finally, for any predicate symbol P that does not belong to Sα, I [Sα], J [Sα] and J ′[Sα] do
not contain any atoms with the predicate symbol P , so
diff (P, I [Sα], J ′[Sα]) = ∅ = diff (P, I [Sα], J [Sα]) .
Thus, we can conclude that
J ′[Sα] <I[Sα] J
[Sα] ,
so J [Sα] does not belong to I [Sα] ⊕N [Sα], which finishes this part of the proof.
For the converse implication, suppose that for some ordinal α < µ, J [Sα] does not
belong to I [Sα] ⊕N [Sα]. If J [Sα] does not belong to N [Sα], we immediately obtain that J
does not belong to N . Consequently, J cannot belong to I ⊕N .
It remains to consider the principal case when J [Sα] belongs to N [Sα]. Then there must
be some interpretation J ′ ∈ N [Sα] such that J ′ <I[Sα] J [Sα]. Thus, for all predicate
symbols P ∈ P we know that
diff (P, I [Sα], J ′) ⊆ diff (P, I [Sα], J [Sα]) . (D3)
We also know that there is some predicate symbol P0 ∈ P such that
diff (P0, I
[Sα], J ′) ( diff (P0, I
[Sα], J [Sα]) . (D4)
Additionally, for every predicate symbol P from P \ Sα it holds that I [Sα], J [Sα] and J ′
contain no atoms with the predicate symbol P , so that
diff (P, I [Sα], J ′) = ∅ = diff (P, I [Sα], J [Sα]) .
Consequently, P0 must belong to Sα. Now let J ′′ = J ′ ∪ J [P\Sα]. It is easy to see that
J ′′[Sα] = J ′ ∈ N [Sα] and for every ordinal β < µ such that β 6= α, J ′′[Sβ ] = J [Sβ ] ∈
N [Sβ ], so since N is sequence-saturated relative to S, J ′′ belongs to N . Now take some
predicate symbol P ∈ P and consider the following two cases:
a) If P belongs to Sα, then from (D3) we obtain
diff (P, I, J ′′) = diff (P, I [Sα], J ′) ⊆ diff (P, I [Sα], J [Sα]) .
b) If P belongs to P \ Sα, then since J ′′[P\Sα] = J [P\Sα],
diff (P, I, J ′′) = diff (P, I, J) .
In both cases we see that diff (P, I, J ′′) is a subset of diff (P, I, J). Moreover, from (D4)
we obtain
diff (P0, I, J
′′) = diff (P0, I
[Sα], J ′) ( diff (P0, I
[Sα], J [Sα]) .
It follows from the above considerations that J ′′ <I J . Consequently, J does not belong
to I ⊕N .
Proposition 92
Let S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be a saturation sequence, M,N ∈ M be both sequence-saturated
relative to S and J be a Herbrand interpretation. Then
J ∈M ⊕N ⇐⇒ (∀α < µ)(J [Sα] ∈M [Sα] ⊕N [Sα]) .
Proof
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We know that J belongs to M ⊕ N if and only if for some I ∈ M , J belongs to I ⊕ N .
By Proposition 91, this holds if and only if
(∀α < µ)(J [Sα] ∈ I [Sα] ⊕N [Sα]) . (D5)
At the same time, the right hand side of our equivalence is true if and only for some
sequence of Herbrand interpretations 〈Iα〉α<µ, the following holds:
(∀α < µ)(J [Sα] ∈ I [Sα]α ⊕N
[Sα]) . (D6)
It remains to show that (D5) is equivalent to (D6). Indeed, it is easy to see that (D5) implies
(D6) by putting Iα = I for all α < µ. Now suppose that (D6) holds and put
I =
⋃
α<µ
I [Sα]α .
Then it holds for every α < µ that I [Sα] = I [Sα]α ∈M [Sα]. Since M is sequence-saturated
relative to S, this implies that I belongs to M . Moreover, we can also conclude that J [Sα]
belongs to I [Sα]⊕N [Sα]. As a consequence, (D5) is satisfied and our proof is finished.
Proposition 93
Let S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be a saturation sequence, M,N ∈ M be both sequence-saturated
relative to S and J be a Herbrand interpretation. If M ⊕N is nonempty, then
(M ⊕N)[Sα] = M [Sα] ⊕N [Sα] .
Proof
Suppose that J belongs to (M⊕N)[Sα]. ThenM⊕N contains some interpretation J ′ such
that J ′[Sα] = J . Also, by Proposition 92 it follows that J ′[Sα] belongs to M [Sα] ⊕N [Sα],
so J also belongs there.
For the converse implication, suppose that J belongs to M [Sα] ⊕ N [Sα], take some
J ′ ∈ M ⊕ N and put J ′′ = J ∪ J ′[P\Sα]. By Proposition 92 it follows that for every
β < µ, J ′[Sβ] belongs toM [Sβ ]⊕N [Sβ ]. Also, whenever β 6= α, J ′′[Sβ ] = J ′[Sβ], so J ′′[Sβ]
belongs to M [Sβ ] ⊕ N [Sβ ]. Moreover, J ′′[Sα] = J , so J ′′[Sα] belongs to M [Sα] ⊕ N [Sα],
and by using Proposition 92 again we obtain that J ′′ belongs toM⊕N . As a consequence,
J belongs to (M ⊕N)[Sα] because J = J ′′[Sα].
Proposition 94
Let S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be a saturation sequence, M,N ∈ M be both nonempty and sequence-
saturated relative to S and J be a Herbrand interpretation. Then
J [Sα] ∈M [Sα] ⊕N [Sα] ⇐⇒ J ∈ σ(M,Sα)⊕ σ(N,Sα) .
Proof
By applying Proposition 92 on σ(M,Sα) and σ(N,Sα) it follows that for any Herbrand
interpretation J ,
J ∈ σ(M,Sα)⊕ σ(N,Sα)⇐⇒ (∀β < µ)
(
J [Sβ ] ∈ σ(M,Sα)
[Sβ ] ⊕ σ(N,Sα)
[Sβ ]
)
.
(D7)
By Lemma 38 it follows that whenever β 6= α, σ(M,Sα)[Sβ ] = I [Sβ ] and σ(M,Sα)[Sβ ] =
I [Sβ ], so that by Corollary 83 we obtain that σ(M,Sα)[Sβ ]⊕ σ(N,Sα)[Sβ] = I [Sβ ]. Thus,
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condition (D7) gets simplified to
J ∈ σ(M,Sα)⊕ σ(N,Sα) ⇐⇒ J
[Sα] ∈ σ(M,Sα)
[Sα] ⊕ σ(N,Sα)
[Sα] .
Furthermore, by Proposition 34, σ(M,Sα)[Sα] = M [Sα] and sσ(N,Sα)[Sα] = N [Sα], so
we obtain
J ∈ σ(M,Sα)⊕ σ(N,Sα)⇐⇒ J
[Sα] ∈M [Sα] ⊕N [Sα] .
This completes our proof.
Corollary 95
Let S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be a saturation sequence, M,N ∈ M be both sequence-saturated
relative to S and J be a Herbrand interpretation. If M ⊕N is nonempty, then
σ(M ⊕N,Sα) = σ(M,Sα)⊕ σ(N,Sα) .
Proof
Lemma 84 implies that since M ⊕N is nonempty, both M and N must also be nonempty.
Furthermore, an interpretation J belongs to σ(M ⊕N,Sα) if and only if J [Sα] belongs to
(M ⊕N)[Sα]. By Proposition 93 this holds if and only if J [Sα] belongs to M [Sα]⊕N [Sα].
Finally, by Proposition 94, this holds if and only if J belongs to σ(M,Sα) ⊕ σ(N,Sα),
which finishes our proof.
Definition 96 (Saturation Sequence Induced by a Splitting Sequence)
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence. The saturation sequence induced by U is the
sequence 〈Sα〉α<µ where
• S0 = U0;
• for any ordinal α such that α+ 1 < µ, Sα+1 = Uα+1 \ Uα;
• for any limit ordinal α, Sα = ∅.
Proposition 97
Let T be a first order theory, U be a splitting sequence for T and S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be the
saturation sequence induced by U . If M is the MKNF model of T , then M is sequence-
saturated relative to S and for every ordinal α such that α < µ, σ(M,Sα) is the MKNF
model of bSα(T ).
Proof
By Lemma 87 we know that M = mod(T ) =
⋂
φ∈T mod(φ). Also, since U is a splitting
sequence for T , for every formula φ ∈ T there exists a unique α < µ such that φ belongs
to bSα(T ). Thus, we obtain
M = mod(T ) =
⋂
φ∈T
mod(φ) =
⋂
α<µ
⋂
φ∈bSα (T )
mod(φ) =
⋂
α<µ
mod(bSα(T )) .
Let Xα = mod(bSα(T )), so that
M =
⋂
α<µ
Xα .
We can use Lemma 87 to conclude that Xα is the MKNF model of bSα(T ). Furthermore,
since Sα includes pr(bSα(T )), it follows by Proposition 29 that Xα is saturated relative to
Sα. Thus, we can now use Proposition 48 to conclude thatXα = σ(M,Sα). It also follows
by Proposition 47 that M is sequence-saturated relative to S.
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Proposition 98
Let T be a first-order theory, U be a splitting sequence for T and S be the saturation
sequence induced by U . If for every ordinal α < µ, Xα is the MKNF model of bSα(T ),
then
⋂
α<µXα is the MKNF model of T .
Proof
By Lemma 87, it holds for every α < µ that Xα = mod(bSα(T )). Also, since U is a
splitting sequence for T , for every formula φ ∈ T there exists a unique α < µ such that φ
belongs to bSα(T ). Hence,⋂
α<µ
Xα =
⋂
α<µ
mod(bSα(T )) =
⋂
α<µ
⋂
φ∈bSα(T )
mod(φ) =
⋂
φ∈T
mod(φ) = mod(T ) .
Furthermore, since Sα includes pr(bSα(T )), it follows by Proposition 29 that Xα is satu-
rated relative to Sα. By Proposition 48 we now obtain that
⋂
α<µXα is nonempty. Conse-
quently, by Lemma 87,
⋂
α<µXα = mod(T ) is the unique MKNF model of T .
Lemma 99
Let U be a set of predicate symbols, N ∈ M be saturated relative to U and I, J be
Herbrand interpretations. If J belongs to I ⊕N , then I coincides with J on P \ U .
Proof
If J belongs to I ⊕ N , then J also belongs to N . Put J ′ = J [U ] ∪ I [P\U ]. Then J ′[U ] =
J [U ] ∈ N , so since N is saturated relative to U , J ′ belongs to N . Furthermore, for any
predicate symbol P ∈ U , diff (P, I, J ′) = diff (P, I, J) and for any predicate symbol
P ∈ P \ U , diff (P, I, J ′) = ∅ ⊆ diff (P, I, J). If this inclusion was proper for some
predicate symbol P , then we would obtain that J ′ <I J holds, contrary to the assumption
that J belongs to I ⊕N . Thus, for all predicate symbols P ∈ P \U , diff (P, I, J) must be
equal to ∅. It follows that J [P\U ] = J ′[P\U ] = I [P\U ], which is the desired result.
Lemma 100
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and M,N ∈ M be both saturated relative to U . Then
M ⊕N is also saturated relative to U .
Proof
Suppose that J is a Herbrand interpretation such that J [U ] belongs to (M ⊕ N)[U ] but J
does not belong to M ⊕ N . Then there exists some interpretation J ′ from M ⊕ N such
that J ′[U ] = J [U ]. This also implies that J ′ belongs to N and since N is saturated relative
to U , J also belongs to N . Furthermore, there must exist some interpretation I ∈ M
such that J ′ belongs to I ⊕ N . By Lemma 99 we obtain that I [U ] = J ′[U ] = J [U ]. Let
I ′ = I [U ] ∪ J [P\U ]. Then I ′[U ] = I [U ] and I ′[P\U ] = J [P\U ] and since M is saturated
relative to U , I ′ belongs to M . Since J does not belong to M ⊕N , there must exist some
interpretation J ′′ ∈ N such that J ′′ <I′ J . This means that for any predicate symbol
P ∈ U we have
diff (P, I ′, J ′′) ⊆ diff (P, I ′, J)
and for every predicate symbol P ∈ P \ U we have
diff (P, I ′, J ′′) = diff (P, I ′, J) = ∅
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because I ′ coincides with J on P \ U . There must also exist some predicate symbol P0
such that
diff (P0, I
′, J ′′) ( diff (P0, I
′, J) .
Since this is impossible if P0 belongs to P \ U , P0 must belong to U . Now let J ′′′ =
J ′′[U ] ∪ J ′[P\U ]. For predicate symbols P ∈ U we have
diff (P, I, J ′′′) = diff (P, I ′, J ′′) ⊆ diff (P, I ′, J) = diff (P, I, J ′)
and for predicate symbols P ∈ P \ U we have
diff (P, I, J ′′′) = diff (P, I, J ′) = ∅ .
Also, for P0 we obtain
diff (P0, I, J
′′′) = diff (P0, I
′, J ′′) ( diff (P0, I
′, J) = diff (P0, I, J
′)
As a consequence, J ′′′ <I J ′, which is in conflict with the assumption that J ′ belongs to
I ⊕N .
Proposition 101
Let U be a set of predicate symbols and U = 〈Ui〉i<n be a finite sequence of first-order
theories such that for every i < n, pr(Ui) is included in U . Then the minimal change
update model of U is saturated relative to U .
Proof
Follows using induction on i by Proposition 29 and by Lemma 100.
Proposition 102
Let U = 〈Ui〉i<n be a finite sequence of first-order theories, U be a splitting sequence for
U and S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be the saturation sequence induced by U . IfM is the minimal change
update model of U , thenM is sequence-saturated relative to S and for every ordinalα < µ,
σ(M,Sα) is the minimal change update model of bSα(U).
Proof
We prove by induction on n.
1◦ If n = 0, then U = 〈 〉, so M = I by definition. Thus, M is trivially sequence-
saturated relative to S. Moreover, for every α < µ, bSα(U) = 〈 〉, and σ(M,Sα) =
σ(I, Sα) = I, so σ(M,Sα) is the minimal change update model of bSα(U).
2◦ We assume the claim holds for n and prove it for n+ 1. Suppose M ′ is the minimal
change update model of U ′ = 〈Ui〉i<n+1. It follows from Proposition 90 that M ′ =
M ⊕ N where M is the minimal change update model of U = 〈Ui〉i<n and N is
the MKNF model of Un. We need to prove that for every α < µ, σ(M ′, Sα) is the
minimal change update model of bSα(U ′).
Take some arbitrary but fixed α < µ. By the inductive assumption we obtain that
M is sequence-saturated relative to S and σ(M,Sα) is the minimal change update
model of bSα(U). Also, by Proposition 97,N is sequence-saturated relative to S and
σ(N,Sα) is the MKNF model of bSα(Un). Furthermore, by Corollary 95,
σ(M ′, Sα) = σ(M ⊕N,Sα) = σ(M,Sα)⊕ σ(N,Sα) ,
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and by another application of Proposition 90 we obtain that σ(M ′, Sα) is the mini-
mal change update model of bSα(U ′).
It remains to show that M ′ is sequence-saturated relative to S. Suppose that J is a
Herbrand interpretation such that J [Sα] belongs to M ′[Sα]. We conclude by Proposi-
tion 93 that for any α < µ, J [Sα] belongs to M [Sα] ⊕ N [Sα]. Thus, by Proposition
92, J belongs to M ⊕N =M ′ as desired.
Proposition 103
Let U = 〈Ui〉 be a finite sequence of first-order theories, U be a splitting sequence for U
and S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be the saturation sequence induced by U . If for every ordinal α < µ,
Xα is the minimal change update model of bSα(U), then
⋂
α<µXα is the minimal change
update model of U .
Proof
We prove by induction on n.
1◦ If n = 0, then U = 〈 〉 and for every α < µ, bSα(U) = 〈 〉, so Xα = I and
M =
⋂
α<µXα = I, so M is indeed the minimal change update model of U .
2◦ We assume the claim holds for n and prove it for n+1. Suppose that for every ordinal
α < µ, X ′α is the minimal change update model of bSα(U ′) where U ′ = 〈Ui〉i<n+1.
We need to show that
⋂
α<µX
′
α is the minimal change update model of U ′.
It follows from Proposition 90 that X ′α = Xα ⊕ Yα where Xα is the minimal
change update model of bSα(U), where U = 〈Ui〉i<n, and Yα is the MKNF model of
bSα(Un). Thus, by the inductive assumption,M =
⋂
α<µXα is the minimal change
update model of U . Also, by Proposition 98, N =
⋂
α<µ Yα is the MKNF model
of Un. Moreover, we know from Proposition 101 that both Xα and Yα are saturated
relative to Sα. Thus, we can use Proposition 48 to conclude that Xα = σ(M,Sα)
and Yα = σ(N,Sα) and that both M and N are nonempty and by Proposition 47
they are also sequence-saturated relative to S. We can thus apply Propositions 92
and 94 to obtain
M ⊕N =
⋂
α<µ
σ(M,Sα)⊕ σ(N,Sα) =
⋂
α<µ
Xα ⊕ Yα =
⋂
α<µ
X ′α .
Thus, by Proposition 90 it follows that
⋂
α<µX
′
α is the minimal change update
model of U ′.
Appendix E Splitting Theorem for Dynamic Logic Programs
Proposition 104 (Positive Support)
Let I be a dynamic stable model of a dynamic logic programP . Then for every p ∈ I there
exists a rule r from ρ(P)P such that H(r) = p and I |= B(r).
Proof
Follows by definition and the fact that the least model of a definite logic program satisfies
support.
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Proposition 105 (Generalisation of Stable Models)
Let P be a logic program. Then I is a stable model of P if and only if I is a dynamic stable
model of P .
Proof
See (Leite 2003) for a proof using a slightly different definition of a dynamic stable model.
The proof for the semantics we use is analogical.
Proposition 106
LetP = 〈Pi〉i<n be a dynamic logic program with n > 0 and I be a dynamic stable model
of P . Then I |= Pn−1.
Proof (sketch)
Follows from the fact that rules in Pn−1 cannot be rejected by rules in preceding programs
and in case they reject each other, no dynamic stable model exists.
We will use the terms “splitting set” and “splitting sequence” for (dynamic) logic pro-
grams without defining them formally, assuming they are the natural specializations of the
notions defined for (dynamic) hybrid knowledge bases.
Definition 107
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a dynamic logic program P . A solution to P
with respect to U is a sequence 〈Iα〉α<µ of Herbrand interpretations such that
1. I0 is a dynamic stable model of bU0(P);
2. For any ordinal α such that α+ 1 < µ, Iα+1 is a dynamic stable model of
eUα
(
bUα+1(P),
⋃
η≤α Iη
)
;
3. For any limit ordinal α < µ, Iα = ∅;
Proposition 108
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence for a dynamic logic program P . Then I is a
dynamic stable model of P if and only if I =
⋃
α<µ Iα for some solution 〈Iα〉α<µ to P
with respect to U .
Proof (sketch)
We need to prove that I is a dynamic stable model of P if and only if I =
⋃
α<µ Iα where
• I0 is a dynamic stable model of P0 = bU0(P);
• for any ordinal α such that α + 1 < µ, Iα+1 is a dynamic stable model of Pα+1 =
eUα(bUα+1(P),
⋃
η≤α Iα);
• for any limit ordinal α < µ, Iα = ∅.
This basically follows from the splitting sequence theorem for logic programs (Lifschitz and Turner 1994).
However, the unconstrained set of default assumptions Def (P , I) is troublesome here. In
order to overcome the problems associated with it, we need to introduce the set
Def (P , I, S) = { ∼p | pr(p) ⊆ S ∧ (¬∃r ∈ ρ(P))(H(r) = p ∧ I |= B(r)) } ,
and prove that as long as S includes pr(P), Def (P , I) can be replaced by Def (P , I, S)
in the definition of a dynamic stable model, if accompanied by a suitable restriction in the
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definition of I ′ as well, i.e. I ′ = I ∪ { not p | p is an atom, pr(p) ⊆ S and p /∈ I }. Now
let S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be the saturation sequence induced by U and let
Q = [ρ(P) \Rej (P , I)] ∪Def (P , I,P) ,
Qα = [ρ(Pα) \ Rej (Pα, Iα)] ∪Def (Pα, Iα, Sα) ,
where, depending on the part of the equivalence we are proving, Iα is either defined to be
I [Sα], or it is the dynamic stable model of Pα and I is the union of all Iα.
It then needs to be shown that Q0 = bU0(Q) and that for every ordinal α such that
α + 1 < µ, Qα = eUα(bUα+1(Q),
⋃
η≤α Iη). Note that the rejection happens the same
way in Q and in Qα because rules with the same predicate symbol in the head are always
together in the same Qα. Once this is done, replacing every default literal ∼p by a new
atom not p will not change anything about it. Thus, by the splitting sequence theorem for
logic programs,
least(Q) =
⋃
α<µ
least(Qα)
and the desired result follows from this by definition of a dynamic stable model.
Appendix F Proofs of Properties of Hybrid Update Operator
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Let U be a splitting sequence for a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base K. A solution to
K with respect to U is a sequence of MKNF interpretations 〈Xα〉α<µ such that
1. X0 is a dynamic MKNF model of bU0(K);
2. For any ordinal α such that α+ 1 < µ, Xα+1 is a dynamic MKNF model of
eUα
(
bUα+1(K),
⋂
η≤αXη
)
;
3. For any limit ordinal α < µ, Xα = I.
Proposition 15 (Layers of an Updatable Dynamic Hybrid Knowledge Base are Basic)
Let U be an update-enabling splitting sequence for a dynamic hybrid knowledge base K
and X ∈ M. Then bU0(K) is a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base and for any ordinal
α such that α+1 < µ, eUα(bUα+1(K), X) is also a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base.
Proof of Proposition 15
We know bU0(K) is reducible relative to ∅, which means that it either contains no ontology
axioms, or all rules inside it are facts. Thus, it is basic.
Now pick some ordinal α such that α + 1 < µ. Since tUα(bUα+1(K)) is reducible
relative to Uα, either it contains no ontology axioms and so is basic, or all rules in it are
positive and their bodies contain only predicate symbols from Uα. This implies that in
eUα(bUα+1(K), X), all rules are positive facts, so it is basic.
Proposition 110
Let K be a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base and U be a splitting sequence for K.
ThenM is a dynamic MKNF model of K if and only if M =
⋂
α<µXα for some solution
to K with respect to U .
Proof
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Let K = 〈Ki〉i<n, where Ki = 〈Oi,Pi〉.
First suppose thatK isO-based and let U = 〈Ui〉i<n be a sequence of first-order theories
where Ui = ζ (Oi) ∪ Pi. By definition, M is a dynamic MKNF model of K if and only if
M is the minimal change update model of U . Let S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be the saturation sequence
induced by U . Then for any ordinal α such that α+1 < µ and anyX ∈M, the following
holds:
bS0(U) = bU0(U) ,
bSα+1(U) = bUα+1\Uα(U) = tUα(bUα+1(U)) = eUα(bUα+1(U), X) .
The rest follows by Propositions 102 and 103.
Now suppose that K is P-based and let P = 〈Pi〉i<n be a dynamic logic program. If M
is a dynamic MKNF model of K, then M = { J ∈ I | I ⊆ J } for some dynamic stable
model I of P . By Proposition 108, this implies that I =
⋃
α<µ Iα, where
• I0 is a dynamic stable model of bU0(P);
• for every ordinal α such that α + 1 < µ, Iα+1 is a dynamic stable model of
eUα(bUα+1(P),
⋃
η≤α Iη);
• for every limit ordinal α, Iα = ∅.
Put Mα = { J ∈ I | Iα ⊆ J } for every α < µ. Also, for any α < µ,
⋂
η≤α
Mη =
⋂
η≤α
{ J ∈ I | Iη ⊆ J } =

 J ∈ I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
η≤α
Iη ⊆ J


and it can be verified easily that for every literal L,
⋃
η≤α
Iη |= pi(L) if and only if

 J ∈ I
∣∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
η≤α
Iη ⊆ J

 |= pi(L) .
Thus, the following now follows by the definition of a dynamic MKNF model of a basic
dynamic hybrid knowledge base:
• M0 is a dynamic MKNF model of bU0(K);
• for every ordinal α such that α + 1 < µ, Mα+1 is a dynamic MKNF model of
eUα(bUα+1(K),
⋂
η≤αMη);
• for every limit ordinal α, Mα = I.
In other words, 〈Mα〉α<µ is a solution to K with respect to U and
M = { J ∈ I | I ⊆ J } =
{
J ∈ I
∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
α<µ
Iα ⊆ J
}
=
⋂
α<µ
{ J ∈ I | Iα ⊆ J } =
⋂
α<µ
Mα .
The converse implication can be proved analogically by reversing the steps in the above
proof.
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Corollary 111
Let K be a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base, U be a splitting sequence for K and S
be the saturation sequence induced by U . If M is a dynamic MKNF model of K, then M
is sequence-saturated relative to S.
Proof
Follows by Proposition 110, definition of a solution and by Propositions 48 and 47.
Proposition 112
Let U be a set of predicate symbols andK be a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base such
that pr(K) is included in U . Then every dynamic MKNF model of K is saturated relative
to U .
Proof (sketch)
If K is O-based, then this follows from Proposition 101. If K is P-based, then M is a
dynamic MKNF model of P only if M = { J ∈∈ | I ⊆ J } where I , by Proposition 104,
contains only atoms with predicate symbols fromU . This implies that whenever some J [U ]
belongs to M [U ], I is a subset of J [U ] which is a subset of J , and so J belongs toM . Thus,
M is saturated relative to U .
Lemma 113
LetK be a (dynamic) hybrid knowledge base and U, V be sets of predicate symbols. Then,
bU (bV (K)) = bU∩V (K) .
Proof
Follows directly by definition.
Lemma 114
Let K be a (dynamic) hybrid knowledge base, X ∈M, U be a set of predicate symbls and
V be a splitting set for K. Then,
eU (bV (K), X) = bV (eU (K, X)) .
Proof (sketch)
Since V is a splitting set for K, all rules from K whose head atom has a predicate symbol
from V must also have all body literals with predicate symbols from V . Thus, body atoms
discarded in eU (K, X) for rules with a head predicate symbol from V cannot be a reason
for the rule being thrown away by application of bV (·).
Lemma 115
Let U, V be sets of predicate symbols and X,Y be MKNF interpretations such that X is
saturated relative to U , Y is saturated relative to V and X coincides with Y on U ∩ V .
Then,
(X ∩ Y )[U ] = X [U ] and (X ∩ Y )[V ] = Y [V ] .
Proof (sketch)
The left to right inclusions are obvious. If I [U ] belongs to X [U ], then we can construct
an interpretation I ′ = I [U ] ∪ J [U ] where J is some interpretation from Y that coincides
with I on U ∩ V . Because of the assumptions, I ′ will belong to both X and Y . Thus,
I [U ] = I ′[U ] ∈ (X ∩ Y )[U ]. The case with V is symmetric.
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Lemma 116
Let U, V be splitting sets for a (dynamic) hybrid knowledge base K and X,Y be MKNF
interpretations such that X is saturated relative to U , Y is saturated relative to V and X
coincides with Y on U ∩ V . Then,
eU (eV (K, Y ), X) = eU∪V (K, X ∩ Y ) .
Proof (sketch)
For the ontology part of the hybrid knowledge base this holds because
eU (eV (O, Y ), X) = tU (tV (O)) = bP\U (bP\V (O)) = b(P\U)∩(P\V )(O)
= bP\(U∪V )(O) = tU∪V (O) = eU∪V (O, X ∩ Y ) .
For the rule part, we additionally need to observe that on the right hand side, all body atoms
with predicate symbol from U are interpreted under X and all body atoms with predicate
symbol from V are interpreted under Y , and Lemma 115 guarantees that X ∩ Y coincides
with X on U and with Y on V .
Lemma 117
Let U, V be sets of predicate symbols, X ∈ M and let K be a dynamic hybrid knowledge
base such that pr(K) is a a subset of V . Then,
eU (K, X) = eU (K, σ(X,V ))
Proof (sketch)
The second argument of eU (·) is used only to interpret body atoms of rules from K,
which by the assumption contain only predicate symbols from V , and by Proposition 36,
σ(X,V )[V ] = X [V ].
Lemma 118
Let S be a saturation sequence, M ∈ M be sequence-saturated relative to S and U be a
set of predicate symbols. Then σ(M,U) is also sequence-saturated relative to S.
Proof (sketch)
Let I [Sα] ∈ σ(M,U)[Sα] for all α. Then there is some Jα ∈ σ(M,U) such that I [Sα] =
J
[Sα]
α and some Kα ∈ M such that J [U ]α = K [U ]α . From these Kα’s we can construct a
K ∈ M such that K [Sα∩U ] = I [Sα∩U ], from which it follows that K [U ] = I [U ]. Hence,
I ∈ σ(M,U).
Lemma 119
Let K = 〈Ki〉i<n, where Ki = 〈Oi,Pi〉, be a dynamic hybrid knowledge base that is both
O-based and P-based. Then the minimal change update model of 〈ζ (Oi) ∪ Pi〉i<n with
the unique dynamic stable model of 〈Pi〉i<n.
Proof
This can be seen easily since in this case Oi is empty and Pi contains only positive facts,
so that the dynamic stable model of 〈Pi〉i<n coincides with the set of all atoms appearing
as heads of rules in the programs, and this also coincides with its minimal change update
model.
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Lemma 120
Let U = 〈Uα〉α<µ be a splitting sequence, S be the saturation sequence induced by U and
M ∈ M be sequence-saturated relative to S. Then for any ordinal α < µ the following
holds:
⋂
η≤α
σ(M,Sη) = σ

M, ⋃
η≤α
Sη

 = σ(M,Uα) .
Proof
It can be shown by induction that Uα =
⋃
η≤α Sη . If M is empty, then the lemma trivially
follows. Suppose that M contains some interpretation J0. Let I ∈
⋂
η≤α σ(M,Sη). Then
for every ordinal η ≤ α there must exist some interpretation Iη from M such that I [Sη]η =
I [Sη ]. Let J =
⋃
η≤α I
[Sη ] ∪ J
[P\Uα]
0 . It is not difficult to see that J belongs to M due to
the fact that M is sequence-saturated relative to U . Also, J coincides with I on Uα. Thus,
I belongs to M [Uα].
As for the other inclusion, if I belongs to σ(M,Uα), then there is some J ∈ M such
that J coincides with I on Uα. But then J also coincides with I on Sη for every η ≤ α.
Thus, I belongs to
⋂
η≤α σ(M,Sη).
Proposition 17 (Solution Independence)
Let U, V be update-enabling splitting sequences for a dynamic hybrid knowledge base K.
Then M is a dynamic MKNF model of K with respect to U if and only if M is a dynamic
MKNF model of K with respect to V .
Proof of Proposition 17
Suppose M is a dynamic MKNF model of K with respect to U = 〈Uα〉α<µ. Then M =⋂
α<µXα for some solution 〈Xα〉α<µ to K with respect to U . This means that:
• X0 is a dynamic MKNF model of K0 = bU0(K);
• for any ordinal α such that α+1 < µ, Xα+1 is a dynamic MKNF model ofKα+1 =
eUα(bUα+1(K),
⋂
η≤αXη);
• for any limit ordinal α < µ, Xα = I and thus it is a dynamic MKNF model of
Kα = 〈 〉.
We also know from Proposition 15 that Kα is a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base for
every ordinalα < µ. Let S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be the saturation sequence induced by U . We know
that for every α < µ, Kα contains only predicate symbols from Sα, so by Proposition 112,
Xα is saturated relative to Sα. Thus, by Proposition 48,
Xα = σ(M,Sα) .
Moreover, by Lemma 120,
⋂
η≤αXη =
⋂
η≤α σ(M,Sα) = σ(M,Uα), and so
Kα+1 = eUα(bUα+1(K), σ(M,Uα)) .
Now pick some arbitrary but fixed α < µ and suppose that V = 〈Vβ〉β<ν . Since V is
a splitting sequence for K, it is also a splitting sequence for Kα. Thus, by Proposition 110
we know that Xα =
⋂
β<ν Yα,β for some solution 〈Yα,β〉β<ν to Kα with respect to V .
This means that:
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• Yα,0 is a dynamic MKNF model of Kα,0 = bV0(Kα);
• for any ordinal β such that β + 1 < ν, Yα,β+1 is a dynamic MKNF model of
Kα,β+1 = eVβ (bVβ+1(Kα),
⋂
η≤β Yα,η);
• for any limit ordinal β < ν, Yα,β = I and thus it is a dynamic MKNF model of
Kα,β = 〈 〉.
Since Kα is a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base, Kα,β must also be a basic dynamic
hybrid knowledge base. Let T = 〈Tβ〉β<ν be the saturation sequence induced by V . We
know that for every β < ν, Kα,β contains only predicate symbols from Tβ , so by Proposi-
tion 112, Yα,β is saturated relative to Tβ . Thus, by Propositions 48 and 35,
Yα,β = σ(Xα, Tβ) = σ(σ(M,Sα), Tβ) = σ(M,Sα ∩ Tβ) .
Let the sequence of knowledge bases K′ =
〈
K′β
〉
β<ν
be defined as follows:
• K′0 = bV0(K);
• for any ordinal β such that β + 1 < ν, K′β+1 = eVβ (bVβ+1(K), σ(M,Vβ));
• for any limit ordinal β < ν, K′β = 〈 〉.
In the following we prove that for any ordinal β < ν and any ordinalα such that α+1 < µ,
K0,β = bV0(K
′
β) (F1)
Kα+1,β = eUα(bUα+1(K
′
β), σ(M,Uα)) (F2)
Suppose first that β = 0. Then we can use Lemma 113 to obtain
K0,0 = bU0(K0) = bV0(bU0(K)) = bU0∩V0(K) = bU0(bV0(K)) = bU0(K
′
0)
and for any ordinal α such that α + 1 < µ we can apply Lemmas 113 and 114, achieving
the following result:
Kα+1,0 = bV0(Kα+1)
= bV0(eUα(bUα+1(K), σ(M,Uα)))
= eUα(bV0(bUα+1(K)), σ(M,Uα))
= eUα(bUα+1∩V0(K), σ(M,Uα))
= eUα(bUα+1(bV0(K)), σ(M,Uα))
= eUα(bUα+1(K
′
0), σ(M,Uα)) .
Now suppose that β is an ordinal such that β + 1 < ν. Using Lemmas 113 and 114 we
obtain:
K0,β+1 = eVβ (bVβ+1(K0), σ(M,Vβ))
= eVβ (bVβ+1(bU0(K)), σ(M,Vβ))
= eVβ (bU0∩Vβ+1(K), σ(M,Vβ))
= eVβ (bU0(bVβ+1(K)), σ(M,Vβ))
= bU0(eVβ (bVβ+1(K), σ(M,Vβ)))
= bU0(K
′
β+1) .
62 M. Slota and J. Leite and T. Swift
Finally, for any ordinal α such that α + 1 < µ, Lemmas 113, 114 and 116 imply the
following:
Kα+1,β+1 = eVβ (bVβ+1(Kα+1), σ(M,Vβ))
= eVβ (bVβ+1(eUα(bUα+1(K), σ(M,Uα))), σ(M,Vβ))
= eVβ (eUα(bVβ+1(bUα+1(K)), σ(M,Uα)), σ(M,Vβ))
= eUα∪Vβ (bUα+1∩Vβ+1(K), σ(M,Uα) ∩ σ(M,Vβ))
= eUα(eVβ (bUα+1(bVβ+1(K)), σ(M,Vβ)), σ(M,Uα))
= eUα(bUα+1(eVβ (bVβ+1(K), σ(M,Vβ))), σ(M,Uα))
= eUα(bUα+1(K
′
β+1), σ(M,Uα)) .
Now since K′β is saturated relative to Tβ , we can use Lemma 117 to replace σ(M,Uα)
in (F2) by σ(M,Uα ∩ Tβ). Furthermore, by consecutively using Proposition 35, Lemmas
118 and 120 and Proposition 35 again, we can see that
σ(M,Uα ∩ Tβ) = σ(σ(M,Tβ), Uα) =
⋂
η≤α
σ(σ(M,Tβ), Sη)
=
⋂
η≤α
σ(M,Sη ∩ Tβ) =
⋂
η≤α
Yη,β .
Hence, (F2) can be rewritten as:
Kα+1,β = eUα

bUα+1(K′β), ⋂
η≤α
Yη,β


We can now use Proposition 110 and conclude that⋂
α<µ
Yα,β =
⋂
α<µ
σ(M,Sα ∩ Tβ) =
⋂
α<µ
σ(σ(M,Tβ), Sα) = σ(M,Tβ)
is a dynamic MKNF model of K′β . One of the last steps in the proof is to show that M
is sequence-saturated relative to T . We know from Corrolary 111 that Xα is sequence-
saturated relative to T , so we obtain the following:⋂
β<ν
σ(M,Tβ) =
⋂
β<ν
⋂
α<µ
σ(σ(M,Tβ), Sα)
=
⋂
α<µ
⋂
β<ν
σ(σ(M,Sα), Tβ)
=
⋂
α<µ
⋂
β<ν
σ(Xα, Tβ)
=
⋂
α<µ
Xα = M ,
which implies that M is sequence-saturated relative to T . Thus, for any β < ν, Lemma
120 implies that
σ(M,Vβ) =
⋂
η≤β
σ(M,Tη) .
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To sum up, define the sequence of interpretations Z = 〈Zβ〉β<ν by Zβ = σ(M,Tβ). We
know the following:
• Z0 = σ(M,T0) is a dynamic MKNF model of K′0 = bV0(K);
• for any ordinal β such that β + 1 < ν, Zβ+1 = σ(M,Tβ+1) is a dynamic MKNF
model of K′β+1 = eVβ (bVβ+1(K),
⋂
η≤β σ(M,Tη)) = eVβ (bVβ+1(K),
⋂
η≤β Zη);
• for any limit ordinal β < ν, put Zβ = σ(M,Tβ) = σ(M, ∅) = I.
Thus, Z is a solution to K with respect to V . Moreover, since M is sequence-saturated
relative to T , it follows by Proposition 47 that
M =
⋂
β<ν
σ(M,Tβ) =
⋂
β<ν
Zβ .
So M is a dynamic MKNF model of K with respect to V .
Proof of the converse implication is symmetric.
Corollary 18 (Compatibility with Def. 12)
Let K be a basic dynamic hybrid knowledge base and U be a splitting sequence for K.
Then M is a dynamic MKNF model of K if and only if M is a dynamic MKNF model of K
with respect to U .
Proof of Corollary 18
SinceK is basic, 〈P〉 is an update-enabling sequence forK. Also, by the definition,M is a
dynamic MKNF model ofK if and only if K is a dynamic MKNF model of K with respect
to 〈P〉. Finally, by Proposition 17 this holds if and only if M is a dynamic MKNF model
of K with respect to U .
Theorem 20 (Generalisation of MKNF Models)
Let K be an updatable hybrid knowledge base and M be an MKNF interpretation. Then
M is a dynamic MKNF model of 〈K〉 if and only if M is an MKNF model of K.
Proof of Theorem 20
This follows by Theorem 10 and Propositions 105 and 88.
Theorem 21 (Generalisation of Minimal Change Update Semantics)
Let 〈Ki〉i<n, where Ki = 〈Oi,Pi〉, be a dynamic hybrid knowledge base such that Pi is
empty for all i < n. Then M is a dynamic MKNF model of 〈Ki〉i<n if and only if M is the
minimal change update model of 〈ζ (Oi)〉i<n.
Proof of Theorem 21
This follows by Corollary 18 and Lemma 119.
Theorem 22 (Generalisation of Dynamic Stable Model Semantics)
Let K = 〈Ki〉i<n, where Ki = 〈Oi,Pi〉, be a dynamic hybrid knowledge base such that
Oi is empty for all i < n. Then M is a dynamic MKNF model of K if and only if M =
{ J ∈ I | I ⊆ J } for some dynamic stable model I of 〈Pi〉i<n.
Proof of Theorem 22
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This follows by Corollary 18 and Lemma 119.
Theorem 23 (Principle of Primacy of New Information)
Let K = 〈Ki〉i<n be an updatable dynamic hybrid knowledge base with n > 0 and M be
a dynamic MKNF model of K. Then M |= pi(Kn−1).
Sketch of proof of Theorem 23
If M is a dynamic MKNF model of K, then for some update-enabling sequence U =
〈Uα〉α<µ, M =
⋂
α<µXα for some solution to K with respect to U . This means that
• X0 is a dynamic MKNF model of bU0(K);
• for any ordinalα such that α+1 < µ,Xα+1 a dynamic MKNF model of eUα(bUα+1(K),
⋂
η≤αXη);
• for any limit ordinal α, Xα = I.
Let S = 〈Sα〉α<µ be the saturation sequence induced by U . It follows from Propositions
89, 106 and 112 that
• X0 is saturated relative to S0 and X0 |= bU0(Kn−1);
• for any ordinal α such that α + 1 < µ, Xα+1 is saturated relative to Sα+1 and
Xα+1 |= eUα(bUα+1(Kn−1),
⋂
η≤αXη);
• for any limit ordinal α, Xα = I is saturated relative to Sα = ∅.
Thus, by Proposition 47,M is sequence-saturated relative to S, by Proposition 48,Xα =
σ(M,Sα), and by Lemma 120,
⋂
η≤αXη = σ(M,Uα).
Now let φ be some formula from pi(Kn−1). If φ is of the form Kψ where ψ is a first-
order formula, then there must exist a unique set Sα that includes pr(φ). Due to the above
considerations, we can then conclude that Xα |= φ. Furthermore,
Xα |= φ⇐⇒ σ(M,Sα) |= φ⇐⇒ σ(M,Sα)
[Sα] |= φ⇐⇒M [Sα] |= φ⇐⇒M |= φ .
On the other hand, if φ = pi(r) for some rule r, then the there exists a unique nonlimit
ordinal α such that pr(H(r)) ⊆ Sα and the body of the rule can be divided in two parts,
B1 and B2, such that pr(B1) ⊆ Sα and B2 = ∅ if α = 0 and pr(B2) ⊆ Uα−1 if α > 0.
The case when α = 0 is can be derived from the case when α > 0, so in the following we
only consider the latter case. We have:
M |= B2 ⇐⇒ σ(M,Uα−1) |= B2
M |= B1 ⇐⇒ σ(M,Sα) |= B1
M |= H(r) ⇐⇒ σ(M,Sα) |= H(r)
Hence, if M 6|= B2, then M |= r and we are finished. On the other hand, if M |= B2,
then there is a rule r′ in eUα−1(bUα(K), σ(M,Uα − 1)) such that H(r′) = H(r) and
B(r′) = B1. If M |= B1, then since Xα = σ(M,Uα − 1) |= B1 and since Xα |=
eUα−1(bUα(K), σ(M,Uα − 1)), we obtain that Xα |= H(r′). As a consequence, M |=
H(r), so that M |= r.
